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ABSTRACT
One of the most urgent problems with the US patent system is that there are too many patents of
poor quality. Most blame the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) – its mistakes, overly
generous grant rate, and lack of consistency. But, the quality and quantity of patents in force is
the product of three sets of decisions: to submit an application of certain quality (by the
applicant), to grant the patent (by the patent office), and to renew a patent and keep it in force
(by the applicant/patentee). Startling, there is no consensus way to measure patent quality. This
article addresses these shortcomings by developing new, comparative ways to measure patent
quality, using the benchmark of the European Patent Office (EPO), viewed as the “gold
standard” for patent quality. Tracking the progress of patent submissions, grants, and renewals,
including of close to 100,000 applications filed at both the EPO and USPTO, it reveals subtle
and thus far overlooked differences with implications for how the US should implement and
prioritize improvements to patent quality.
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COMPARATIVE PATENT QUALITY1
On June 8, 1999, the Patent Office, like it does every Tuesday,2 published the names and
numbers of newly issued patents. Among them was the 6,032,137, a patent that described a way
of depositing a check by imaging and sending it, rather than physically transferring it to the bank.
3
The inventor, Claudio Ballard, tried for several years to develop the invention. He failed, but
the technology thrived. After unsuccessful talks with JP Morgan Chase, Ballard’s company,
DataTreasury, sued a dozen or so banks and companies for patent infringement.4 In 2003,
Congress passed the “Check 21” Act, clearing the way for check imaging to become standard.5
In February 2006, DataTreasury used the ‘137 and related patents and used them to sue 30
banks.6 In 2010, after DataTreasury won its first lawsuit, including based on the finding that JP
Morgan had knowingly infringed Ballard’s patents,7 Ballard was named inventor of the year.8
In 2013, Fidelity National Information Services, after being sued by Ballard, asked the
USPTO to take a second look at the Ballard patents. It agreed. In 2015, a panel of patent judges
revoked the ‘137 patent as overly broad and vague, and therefore invalid.9 The Community

1

© Colleen Chien, 2016. I thank Deitmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers, Arti Rai, Norman Siebrasse, Tom Cotter,
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2
With a few exceptions, since Tuesday, January 18, 1848 (correspondence with the USPTO on file with the author).
3
U.S Patent No. 6,032,137 (issued Feb 29, 2000).
4
Jennifer A. Kingson, Small Company is Specializing in Suing Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2004), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/25/business/small-company-is-specializing-in-suing-banks.html?_r=0. (Cases
include: Data Treasury Corp v. First Data Corp, et al., N.D.Tex. 3:02-cv-02429; Datatreasury Corp v. First Data
Corp, et al., E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv-00094-DF-CMC; DataTreasury Corp v. Electronic Data Sys, N.D.Tex. 3:02-cv02643-K; DataTreasury Corp v. Bank One Corporation, N.D.Tex. 3:03-cv-00059; Datatreasury Corp v. Ingenico
S.A., et al. E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv-00095-DF-CMC; Datatreasury Corp v. J.P. Morgan Chase Co, et al., E.D.Tex. 5:02-cv00124-DF-CMC.)
5
See Kingson, supra note ___.
6
DataTreasury Corporation v. Wells Fargo & Company, et al., E.D.Tex. 2:06-cv-00072-DF-CE.
7
Jim Hammerand, U.S. Bank Ordered To Pay $53 Million In Check Imaging Lawsuit, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2010/09/27/daily20.html (last visited 6/7/2016).
8
DataTreasury Founder Claudio Ballard Named 2010 ‘Inventor of the Year’ by U.S. Business and Industry
Council, BUSINESS WIRE (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101005007171/en/DataTreasury-Founder-Claudio-Ballard-Named2010-%E2%80%9CInventor#.VgFXdBFVhBc (last visited 6/7/2016).
9
Matthew Bultman, DataTreasury Patents Nixed by PTAB in AIA Review, Law360 (Apr. 29, 2015), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/649511/datatreasury-patents-nixed-by-ptab-in-aia-review (last visited 6/7/2016)
(describing the invalidation of the ‘137 and 5,910,988 patents).
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Bankers hailed the verdict “a victory for community banks.”10 By that time DataTreasury and its
two employees had already collected $350M in licensing fees.11
Patent 8,112,504, filed by James Logan and others, followed a similar path.12 In the
1990s, Logan had attempted to develop an alternative to radio – a music player that would
deliver music and content based on past listening habits. He failed.13 But through a series of legal
maneuvers involving multiple patent examiners, Logan was able to get the ‘504 patent issued in
2012, more than a decade after he first told the Patent Office about the invention.14 Logan used
the patent to sue Apple Inc. multiple times,15 and demanded fees from dozens of podcasters.
Podcasters like Marc Maron of the show “WTF” reacted strongly, saying of the campaign, “It’s
serious bullshit.”16 The Electronic Frontier Foundation launched a “Save Podcasting” campaign,
attracting over a thousand donors to fund the PTO’s legal review of the patent.17 On April 11,
2015, the Office decided that it had been a mistake to issue the patent in the first place. The
technology wasn’t novel – it had previously been invented by the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, and was obvious in light of work CNN had done.18
Stories like these contribute to the perception that one of the most – if not the most –
significant problems with the patent system is that there are too many patents of poor quality.19
Mistaken transfers, like the $350M paid from banks to DataTreasury’s invalid patents, lead to
higher prices and a loss of consumer welfare.20 The dynamic effect of allowing patents over
routine and incremental advances that would have happened anyway has led to the growth in
10

ICBA Applauds Patent Board’s Ruling against DataTreasury, INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY BANKERS OF AMERICA,
(May 8, 2015), available at
https://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=293787&navItemNumber=183939 (last visited
6/7/2016).
11
Alex Lawson, Controversial DataTreasury Patents Face Biz Method Review, LAW360 (Nov. 8, 2013), available
at http://www.law360.com/articles/487185/controversial-datatreasury-patents-face-biz-method-review (last visited
6/7/2016).
12
Joe Mullin, Infamous ‘’Podcasting Patent’’ Knocked Out, ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 10, 2015), available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/infamous-podcasting-patent-knocked-out-in-patent-office-challenge/
(last visited 6/7/2016).
13
Id.
14
File History of Patent 8,112,504 (available at http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair), showing that the ‘504 is a
divisional of the 09/782,546 patent application, filed 02-13-2001, which in turn is a divisional of the 08/724,813
application, filed 10-02-1996).
15
Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc et al., (E.D.Tex. 2010), 9:09-cv-00111-RC; Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple,
Inc. (E.D.Tex. 2010) 9:11-cv-00120-RC; Personal Audio, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83746 (E.D.
Tex. 2011).
16
Marc Maron, Podcasters are Under Attack from Patent Trolls, WTF WITH MARC MARON (Mar. 4, 2013),
available at http://www.wtfpod.com/dispatches/entries/podcasters_are_under_attack_from_patent_trolls.
17
Daniel Nazer, UPDATE: EFF Fights Patent Troll Demand for Save Podcasting Campaign Donor Information,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 31, 2014), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/eff-fightspatent-troll-demand-eff-podcast-donor-information.
18
PTAB Decision, EFF v. Personal Audio, LLC Case IPR2014-00070 (available at
https://www.eff.org/document/uspto-decision)
19
DataTreasury’s patents, in fact, motivated passage of the America Invents Act as described in Ryan
Davis, Singled Out In Patent Bill, DataTreasury Files New Suit, LAW360 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/270394.
20
See, e.g. 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___ , ch. 1, at 2.
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certain types of patents outstripping the growth in R&D (see FIG__)21 and a more general tax on
innovation, as small and large firms dedicate resources to filing applications to avoid having to
pay licensing fees to others.22 The perception that the Patent Office makes many mistakes – 42%
of the patents that are reviewed by courts,23 and a much higher share of patents that the Patent
Office choses to review based on petitions are overturned24 – invites legal maneuvers and game
playing by applicants. One such tactic involves refiling the same patent multiple times until a
favorable outcome is achieved 25– even if it takes over a decade, as in the case of the podcasting
patent.
Policy interest in patent quality has reached a new high recently, as the growth in patent
litigation based business models has attracted the attention of Congress,26 Supreme Court
justices,27 President Obama,28 and numerous government agencies including the Federal Trade
Commission,29 and Department of Justice.30 In 2015, the Director of the USPTO launched an
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative,31 making patent quality the cornerstone of her administration.
That year, the House Judiciary Committee, with jurisdiction over the courts, initiated an
investigation into “issues related to patent quality” and tasked the General Accounting Office
with the production of lengthy reports on the topic.32 Volumes have been written about the
21

Infra Part II.
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for
the Patent System (“Arms Race”), 62 HASTINGS L. J. 297 (describing the origins and practice of defensive patenting,
the filing of patents in order to ensure freedom to operate and pay reduced license fees, by large and small firms).
23
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and David R. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent
Litigation, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1769, 1787 (2014)
24
Patent Public Advisory Committee Quarterly Meeting: Patent Trial and Appeal Board Update, USPTO 3 (Feb.
19, 2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150219_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf
(showing that 84% of IPR cases have all or some of their claims invalidated).
25
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U.L.R. 63, 66-71 (2004).
(describing and critiquing the practice of allowing applicants to seek without limit review of their patent
applications), see also infra Part III.
26
See, e.g. INNOVATION ACT, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013), which passed the House in 2013 with vote of 325 –
91, and the low-quality patents and patent troll lawsuits that the Act was designed to address, as described at the
Judiciary Committee Innovation Act website, available at https://judiciary.house.gov/the-innovation-act/ (last visited
7/6/2016).
27
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 and 399 (2006) Kennedy concurrence (noting the
development of “firms [that] use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees,” and the enforcement of patents of “potential vagueness and suspect validity.”)
28
See, e.g. The White House, President Obama Participates in a Fireside Hangout on Google+, YOUTUBE (Feb. 14,
2013), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kp_zigxMS-Y (calling for the development of “smarter
patent laws” to address the problems caused by patent trolls, entities that “don't actually produce anything
themselves. They're just trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if they can extort
some money out of them.”)
29
FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH
COMPETITION, 50-51, 137-48 (March 2011).
30
DEPT. OF JUSTICE and FED. TRADE COMM’N, PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES (December 2012),
described at https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/public-workshop-patent-assertion-entity-activities (workshop
website including public comments pertaining to patent assertion entities).
31
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE SHOULD DEFINE QUALITY, REASSESS
INCENTIVES, AND IMPROVE CLARITY, Introduction (“2016 GAO Quality Report”), at 2 (June 2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678113.pdf.
32
Id. at 7.
22
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costs33 and causes of low patent quality, including apparent defects, for example, in patent law,34
patent procedures,35 and institutional incentives.36
But problems of low patent quality, while urgent, are not new. Independent government
reviews in 1990, 1997, 2000, 2007, 2015, and 2016 each found serious problems with the
USPTO’s quality processes.37 The Patent Quality Review Office at the USPTO was created in
1974 to address quality concerns.38 Patent examination as we know it today was introduced in
1836 to remedy the previous system’s defect of registering patents without applying any quality
filters at all, “deluging the country with worthless monopolies and laying the foundation for
endless litigation,”39 according to a Senate report. The patent registration system that preceded it,
in turn, was motivated by the challenges that the first patent examiners – a board comprised of
the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of War, among them the Founding
Fathers of the United States – met in trying to thoroughly examine patent applications despite
their demanding schedules.40
Yet patent quality issues have persisted. Why? First, we lack the ability to measure patent
quality. That is to say, there is no consistent definition of, much less any consensus way of
measuring, patent quality. 41 This omission is as crippling as it is startling, making it impossible
33

See, e.g., 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___, at 4 (describing the anticompetitive effects of low-quality patents
including unwarranted market power and unjustifiable cost increases); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua
Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011) (expressing concern
over the outsized impact, and high invalidity rate, of patents that are asserted more than eight times).
34
See, e.g., 2003 FTC IP Report, supra note ___ , at 10–12 (recommending the elevation of obviousness standards
in US patent law); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J.
1590 (2011) (also recommending elevated obviousness standards); Mark A. Lemley & Doug Lichtman, Rethinking
Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that in light of low patent quality,
patents shouldn’t be given the presumption of validity).
35
See, e.g., Michael Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing
Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data (“Time Allocated”), (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20337, 2014) (blaming time pressures in patent examination for the
issuing of marginal patents); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1541 (2009) (blaming the USPTO’s “monopoly” on assessing patentability for producing for poor-quality
patents).
36
See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (2009)
(describing the patent system incentive’s support of large numbers of low-quality patents).
37
Seven Criteria for Evaluating the Patent System, in A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill,
Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004), at 49-50 (describing government quality audits in 2000); PETER
DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 72 (2010) (describing
independent reviews in 1990 and 1997); Report in Brief, OFFICE OF INSP. GEN. U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (April 2015),
available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-15-026-A_Abstract.pdf; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENT OFFICE SHOULD STRENGTHEN SEARCH CAPABILITIES AND BETTER
MONITOR EXAMINERS' WORK (2016) (“2016 GAO Search and Monitoring Report”), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-479.
38
Merrill et al., supra note ___, at 50.
39
Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4. (1836), available at
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_for_Bill_
No_293.pdf.
40
P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Society 161
(Mar. 1993).
41
Described infra in Part I.
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to tell whether anecdotes like the ones described earlier are indicative of a broader problem with
quality, and whether policy interventions like the ones currently being applied are working, or
not. Second, while many lament poor patent quality, the incentives in patent examination are
stacked in favor of a patent being granted42 whether or not the invention deserves it. Patent
lawyers are paid to succeed, not fail, in getting patents for their clients. As much as patent
examiners are committed to thoroughly vetting applications, the USPTO is rewarded when it
grants, rather than denies applications, leading to maintenance revenues43 and skirting appeals
and reversals.44 Third, patent quality is hard. Reviewing a patent application and discerning
whether the invention has been done before or is obvious from the perspective of an artisan in
the field, as required by law, is a challenging task.45 Even Thomas Jefferson struggled with it,
writing in 1813, "I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth
to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."46 It is not
always clear that getting patent quality right is worth the effort – many and perhaps most patents
are economically worthless.47
This paper does not presume to offer a silver bullet to a problem that is as old as the
patent system. However it takes the position that before we can expect to make a dent in patent
quality, we need to address these first order problems. It proposes borrowing an age-old practice
– benchmarking – to do so. Because while patent quality is a major focus in the United States
patent system, it has been a priority in other countries as well.48 And so looking at the
comparable experiences of one jurisdiction in particular – the European Patent Office (EPO),
whose jurisdiction is comparable to the USPTO’s in size49 and which in recent years has come to
be viewed by many as the “gold standard” in patent quality50 – is instructive and also, helpful for
overcoming several of the long-standing obstacles that confront patent quality theory and
practice.
First, a comparative view provides a way to actually measure patent quality. Claims
about patent examination, for example, that the resources devoted to patent examination are
42

Wagner, supra note ___, generally. (arguing that by its design, the modern patent system favors the seeking and
granting of patents of low quality).
43
Michael Frakes & Mellissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical
Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns (“Agency Funding”), 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013) (finding that the PTO
acts, in part, on financial incentives that favor the issuance of patents in order to receive maintenance fees on
patentability decisions).
44
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) (arguing that the USPTO’s ability to avoid costly
appeals and reversals by overgranting leads to an inflationary pressure in the patent system).
45
See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note __ , at ___ (describing the task of vetting patent applications as
“herculean”).
46
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Aug. 13, 1813),
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
47
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that the
insignificance of most patents does not support greater investment in their quality).
48
See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the RuleMaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002) (describing patent quality reform agendas in Japan and
Europe).
49
See infra Part I.
50
See infra Part I.
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inadequate51 are oft made but rarely supported. But the use of benchmarks can reveal the extent
and direction of the difference, if any, between the US and EPO “high standard” practice within
any particular area. Second, though the details vary, the basic dynamic of ex parte examination in
which “under-resourced patent-officers…struggle against well-heeled patent-lawyers”52 applies
across patent offices. The specific practices the EPO uses to counterbalance the tilt towards
granting and yet achieve the highest quality ratings can yield useful insights. Finally, because
EPO examiners face the same basic challenge in vetting their applications as their USPTO
counterparts, studying both sets of procedures can offer insights regarding the balance between
high levels of patent quality and other interests such as cost and speed.
Several recent developments vastly improve the case for doing comparative research in
patent quality. In support of international markets, companies have long sought protection in
multiple jurisdictions for the same invention.53 But tracing the fates of the same application in
different jurisdictions has historically been impossible because the United States did not publish
unsuccessful patent applications. That changed in 2002, when the United States implemented
pre-issuance publication,54 which, including time for the completion of the application cycle,
now enables the study of these natural experiments.
Differences between American and European patent systems compromise the usefulness
of comparing them. But a number of gaps have been smoothed recently, through the America
Invents Act of 201155 and the America Inventor Protection Act of 1999.56 On the procedural
side, the USPTO and EPO, as well as other international patent offices, have introduced a
number of collaborative initiatives,57 making it more likely that comparative insights may be
actionable despite the cultural and other differences that remain.58
This paper exploits these developments to empirically compare and contrast patent
quality in the US and Europe and to explore the policy levers that contribute to these differences.
51

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943,
944 (2004) (describing the oft-made claim that examiner resources are inadequate).
52
Time to Fix Patents (Leader), THE ECONOMIST(Aug. 8, 2015), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21660522-ideas-fuel-economy-todays-patent-systems-are-rotten-wayrewarding-them-time-fix.
53
See, e.g., studies by Jensen et al., described infra in Part II.
54
Stuart Graham & Deepak Hegde, Do Inventors Value Secrecy In Patenting? Evidence From The American
Inventor’s Protection Act Of 1999, (unpublished manuscript), at 1, 5, & 23 (2014) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2170555) (describing the transition to a pre-issuance publication
in 2002 brought by the America Inventor Protection Act). Because the Act allows certain inventors to keep their
applications secret, an estimated 7.5 % of patent applications are not published. Id, at 1.
55
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: A New Paradigm for International
Harmonisation?, 24 SING. ACAD. OF L.J. 669, 679 (2012).
56
Graham and Hegde, supra note ___ at 2 (describing the introduction in the US of the 18-month publication
requirement existing in Europe and elsewhere).
57
USPTO Worksharing Programs and Proposals, USPTO
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/global/patents/Worksharing.pdf (describing, e.g. the launch of the IP5, an
information-sharing and coordination initiative among the USPTO, EPO, and three other patent jurisdictions, and
the formation of the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) for sharing search results).
58
See discussion infra in Part I.
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It takes as its unit of analysis all US and EPO patent applications with a priority date in 2002, a
year we chose because enough time has elapsed that the status of the vast majority of patent
applications is resolved.59 In addition, because the US only began publishing patent applications
in 2001, 2002 was the first full year for which US application data was available. The paper
proceeds as follows.
Part I discusses what patent quality is and why, historically, it’s been hard to measure,
reviewing the deficiencies in measures like reversal rate, allowance rate, examiner inconsistency
and pendency. It makes the case for applying a comparative perspective to patent quality, while
acknowledging some of the limitations of such an approach. It applies this perspective to patent
filings in 2002 to reveal that, consistent with the perception that there are too many US patents of
questionable quality, there are projected to be 10 times more US patents in force than by 2022
than EPO patents. However, while the Patent Office is typically blamed for the existence of too
many low-quality patents, our analysis shows the surprising result that the decisions of applicants
in the pre-grant and post-grant periods, not the Patent Office during examination, contribute even
more to the gap between EPO and US in force patents.
Working from the empirical baseline set by Part I, Parts II through IV explore the gaps
between US and EPO patenting, and the doctrinal, procedural, and institutional levers that
explain them. Each part contemplates the insights that may be gleaned from the comparative
view and discusses how they may be leveraged to improve US patent quality.
Patenting proceeds in three stages – application, examination, and post-issuance; choices
made during each of them have implications for patent quality. This article begins by examining
quality (and quantity) levers at the patent application stage in Part II. It finds that, in 2002, there
were roughly two times more EPO than US patent applications, and traces this difference to a
number of trends within and outside of the patent system. These include the growth in computerenabled business models, the challenge of vetting software applications, and the proliferation of
defensive and portfolio patent strategies. The relatively greater subject matter eligibility and
relatively lower fees of the US system have made it more accessible and open, this paper argues,
but also heighten the pressure on its quality filters, an insight that has largely been
unacknowledged.
Moving to the patent examination process, and the heart of this paper’s comparative
analysis, Part III considers quality levers at the patent application stage from the perspective of
99,221 EPO and US application pairs (applications filed in both jurisdictions) from 2002. The
fine-grained analysis presented in this part reveals several novel insights. First, it finds that the
EPO granted patents at a considerably lower rate than the US, on the same applications (50%
EPO vs. 75% US),60 seemingly consistent with the hypothesis that US examiners are more
59

Based on inspection of the legal status data for 7,417 EPO applications filed in September 2002, we found that
about 6% of the EPO applications were still pending. The remainder of the applications were either granted,
withdrawn, or refused. Granular legal status information is not available in bulk form for USPTO applications,
however, we used PATSTAT to determine how many applications had matured into patents (N=5,542), and our
analysis of the file histories of 295 of the remaining 1,876 applications, suggests that 95% of them were resolved.
60
Discussed infra at Part I.
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lenient. Surprisingly, however, it finds that the gap in allowance rates is driven as much by the
behavior of applicants who voluntarily withdraw their applications from the EPO as it is by
examiner rejections. These withdrawals, this paper finds, are often, in turn, based on the EPO’s
highly regarded search reports, whose citation of non-patent literature is almost double that of
US examiners (30% EPO vs. 15% PTO), as well as the consistency and certainty that the EPO’s
team-examination and “once and done” approaches produce. Part III concludes with a discussion
of the implications of these findings for US prosecution.
It may seem that once a patent is granted, its quality is fixed. However, while neglected
by numerous studies of patent quality, the post-grant period, and choices made by patent holders
and third parties, have a direct bearing upon the quantity and quality of patents that are in force
and can help or hinder innovation. As Part IV reports, by year 20, an estimated 12% of European
country patents based on EPO grants remain in force, vs. 37% of US patents, contributing more
to the gap in the quantity of patents in force than differences in grant rate. Post-grant review
procedures initiated by third parties, applicant choices, in response to relatively high EPO and
relatively low USPTO fee levels, and the robust secondary market for US patents all contribute
to the quality and quantity of patent in force. In view of the industry dynamics that fuel the
sustained demand for high-tech patents, the paper argues for further consideration of several
novel interventions that, rather than reducing the number of poor-quality patents, would reduce
the risks associated with poor-quality patents: the “defensive only” patent, in which patentees
give up certain rights of assertion in exchange for lower fees, and a closer alignment of
maintenance fees with social welfare, both of which are consistent with long-standing European
practices.
I.

What Patent Quality Is and Why It’s Hard to Measure
A. Defining Patent Quality

Patent quality encompasses two concepts – (one hard:) avoiding legal mistakes in issuing
(or declining to issue) a patent,61 and (one really hard:) ensuring that society is better off in
granting rather than denying a patent.62 The two concepts are separate, but related. While legal
mistakes, for example, a patent over podcasting even though it’s been done before, generally

61

The most common definition of a quality patent is a valid patent. See e.g. Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser,
A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (March
2012), Drahos supra note ___ at 69 (describing quality patent as a legally correct patent).
62
As articulated, e.g. by Duffy and Abramowicz, supra note ___ at ___. (arguing that a patent should only be
awarded when it acts as an “inducement” for innovation), citing Judge Posner’s argument that, “the framers of the
Constitution and the Patent Code would not have wanted patents to be granted where the invention would have been
made anyway, and about as soon, without any hope of patent protection.” Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697
F.2d 796, 797(7th Cir.), vacated en banc, 723 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1983)), see also Mariagrazia Squicciarini,
Helene Dernis, & Chiara Crisculo, Measuring Patent Quality: Indicators of Technological and Economic Value,
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2013/03 (2013) (proposing a wide array of patent
quality metrics based on economic and technical, rather than legal criteria).
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lead to the loss of social welfare, this loss can occur even if the decision to grant is technically
correct.63
To assess and effect measurable improvements to patent quality, patent quality needs to
measureable. To date, however, there have been no consistent, agreed-upon ways of telling
whether or not a particular patent, or a patent system, is high quality. In 2012, then-Director of
the USPTO David Kappos publicly lamented the lack of a common quality standard, and the
“balkanized approach” of different countries and patent offices to measuring patent quality.64 In
2016, the General Accounting Office, based on an in-depth study of the USPTO, reported that
despite the USPTO’s investments in quality, that the office “does not currently have a consistent
definition for patent quality articulated in agency documents and guidance.’65
Though easier to measure than the social welfare gain or loss produced by a patent, the
rate of mistakes associated with patentability decisions remain elusive. For example, the USPTO
conducts audits to determine the rate of legal errors, as evaluated by quality control specialists,
and to ascertain how satisfied its “customers” (patent applicants) are.66 But these metrics are not
independently calculated or observable. Citing the finding that under current criteria, most
USPTO examiners are considered “above average” and, since 2011, have a better chance of
being rated as “outstanding” or “commendable” with respect to patent quality, a 2015
government report described the USPTO’s quality policies as “ineffective.”67 The academic and
policy conversation has focused on several other measures of patent quality – reversal rate, grant
rate, and consistency in patent examination. As discussed below, each of these has serious
shortcomings.
1. Reversal Rate
One indicia of quality is the extent to which issued patents are overturned, in proceedings
such as the USPTO “second look” programs used to invalidate the podcasting and check imaging
patents described at the outset of this article. In inter partes review proceedings, 84% of
adjudicated patents have at least one claim canceled.68 However, this number is the product of
selection effects, and only applies to claims that the USPTO chooses to review and that the
parties don’t work out on their own. 69 When these filters are applied, only 25% of challenged
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Though not the focus of this paper, the same may be true of a patent application that fails to claim statutory
subject matter, but would enhance, on net, social welfare.
64
Stuart Graham & David Kappos, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent Quality, 53 MIT-SLOAN MGMT. 19
(Spring 2012) (laying out the pathway to a more consistent, unified approach to patent quality)
65
2016 GAO Quality Report, supra note ___ , at 2.
66
2016 GAO Quality Report, supra note ___ , at ___.
67
OFFICE OF INSP. GEN. U.S. DEP'T OF COM, supra note ___ , at ___.
68
James Donald Smith & Scott Boalick, Patent Public Advisory Committee Quarterly Meeting: Patent Trial and
Appeal Board Update, 15 (Feb. 19, 2015), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150219_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf.
69
For a description of the process and selection effects, see e.g. Colleen V. Chien and Chris Helmers, Inter Partes
Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, ___ STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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patent claims are invalidated.70 When post-grant challenge outcomes at the EPO, which is seen
as generating the highest quality patents, and at the USPTO, are compared, their outcomes are
not statistically distinguishable.71 Litigation outcomes suffer similar selection effects – the very
small handful of patents that are actually worth fighting about and sufficiently uncertain that the
parties do not settle are generally of higher value, and are not necessarily representative of all
issued patents.
2. Allowance Rate
A simpler description of the problem is that the USPTO too readily grants patents,
applying such a low bar that a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich72 and a method of
swinging on a swing73 have qualified. To manage public perception, the Patent Office created a
secret “sensitive application program” in 1994 to flag applications that seemed “trivial, mundane,
frivolous… silly or extremely basic.”74 The program only applied to 0.04% of applications and
was retired when it came to light in 2015.75 However, it is striking because it shows that the
chances of implausible applications over “a method for curing baldness” or “a perpetual motion
machine” becoming patents under standard Office procedures were significant enough that a
program to reduce them was needed.76 Whether the initiative succeeded or not is an open
question. During the program’s tenure, the Office issued patents over ideas such as using a
computer to facilitate and record communication between a doctor and patient77 and a cure for
cancer that combines “evening primrose oil, rice, sesame seeds, green beans, coffee, meat,
cheese, milk, green tea extract, evening primrose seeds, and wine” entitled “Diane’s Manna.”78
But determining what the PTO’s “actual” grant rate is, much less what it should be, has
proven elusive. One cannot simply compare applications to grants within a single year because it
takes several years and sometimes even decades for a patent application to resolve, and the
number of applications rises every year. That, unlike anywhere else in the world, it’s impossible
to finally reject a US patent application, further complicates attempts to discern the fates of a set
of applications. Following a cohort of patent applications filed in 2001, Lemley and Sampat
found that despite criticism that the USPTO is issuing too many bad patents, the Office “rejects a
70

USPTO, Inter Partes Review Petitions Terminated to Date (Apr. 30, 2015), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_partes_review_petitions_%2004%2030%202015_0.pdf
(finding 25% of challenged claims unpatentable)
71
In both European opposition, and post-grant US reexamination, both of which lack an initiation filter, about 6065% of challenged patents are either amended or rejected, and in 25-30% of the cases, all the claims are rejected and
the patent is revoked. See Chien and Helmers, supra note ___, at *___.
72
U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued December 21, 1999).
73
U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (issued April 9, 2002).
74
Joe Mullin, USPTO Ends “Warning System” for Outlandish Patents, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2015), available at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/03/uspto-ends-program-for-patents-that-could-create-unwanted-mediacoverage/.
75
Sensitive Application Warning System, USPTO (March 2015), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/initiatives/patent-application-initiatives/sensitive-application-warning-system
76
Id.
77
US Patent No. 8,762,173, titled “Method and Apparatus for Indirect Medical Consultation,” (issued June 24,
2014).
78
US Patent No. 8,609,158 (issued December 17, 2013).
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surprisingly high percentage of patents,”—about a third of them.79 Quillen and Cotropia have
tracked the grant rate over time and report higher, though varying, rates of issuance – more than
90% for most years between 1996 and 2014, except for a decline to less than 70% during the
tenure of USPTO Director Jon Dudas. 80 The PTO’s own economists estimate the grant rate to be
around 56%81 during this period but do not take into account the variety of ways in which
applicants can continue examination even after a patent has been finally rejected. As described
earlier, over half of the time patents are granted following “final” rejection, sometimes without
any changes.82 However, while there is some evidence that the USPTO has a tendency to overgrant patents on the improper basis of the agency’s finances, rather than the merits,83 and that
patent offices in general favor their own nationals, over others,84 there is no consensus about
what an agency’s overall grant rate should be.
3. Examiner Inconsistency
A number of studies have documented the variation among examiners and examination at
the USPTO. They generally find that a number of factors that have nothing to do with the
importance of the invention or strength of the application can have a significant influence on
how the patent application is examined at the USPTO and whether it is allowed. Examiner
factors include how long the examiner has been at the PTO,85 when the examiner was hired by
the patent office,86 the number of patents the examiner has examined, 87 experience levels,88 and
the amount of time given to form a rejection.89 Some examiners are perceived to be too easy,
while others are “too hard.”90 But as troubling as a high level of inconsistency in examination is,
it provides only an indirect measure of patent quality. Further, like grant rate, there is no
79

Mark Lemley and Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp, 58 EMORY L. J. 181 (2008).
Cotropia and Quillen, Patent Applications and the Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as of FY
2014 (Intellectual Property Institute Research Paper No. 2015-01), available at http://law.richmond.edu/docs/FY2014-Update-Figures-and-Tables-1996-2014-29.pdf.
81
Michael Carley, Deepak Hedge and Alan C. Marco, What is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent? 17 YALE
J. L. & TECH. 203 (2015).
82
Zhen Lei & Brain D. Wright, Why Weak Patents? Rational Ignorance or Pro-“customer” Tilt? (CELS 2009 4th
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434275.
83
Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman have done the most comprehensive examination of this topic, and
published their findings through several influential including Frakes and Wasserman, Agency Funding, supra note
___ and Michael Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. __. [add parentheticals]
84
Paul H. Jensen, Alfons Palangkaraya, & Elizabeth Webster Webster, Patent Examination Outcomes and the
National Treatment Principle, 45 RAND J. ECON. 449, 452 (2014)
85
Iain M. Cockburn, Samurl Kortum, & Scott Stern, Are all Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent
Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19 (Wesley M. Cohen
& Stephen Merrill eds., 2003). See also Ronald Mann, The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience
and Attrition, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2149, 2176 (2014). (finding the variation between Examiner to be relatively slight,
but documenting the relative importance of tenure, over experience, to the examination).
86
Frakes, Michael and Melissa Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 Duke L.J.___ (forthcoming 2016)
87
Cockburn et al, supra note ___, at ___.
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Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. OF ECON.
AND STAT. 817, 827 (2012).
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Frakes and Wasserman, Time Allocated, supra note ___ at ___.
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consensus about how much consistency would be desirable, and limited information about the
tradeoffs between consistency and other aspects of the management of patent examination,
including cost and hiring. The size of the patent backlog and variations in the pendency of
patents have also been cast as matters of patent quality,91 insofar as untimely patent examination
is considered to be low-quality patent examination.
B. Towards a Comparative Approach to Patent Quality
Although each is imperfect, together, existing approaches provide a wish list of sorts for
measuring patent quality. Patent quality metrics should be independently calculable and
observable by neutral third parties, not those with vested interests.92 They should provide
accurate representations of applicant and examiner behavior in a large number of cases, unlike
the reversal rates of the handful of patents that are adjudicated by the court or PTO. In order to
inform patent improvement efforts, patent process indicators, like examiner consistency or
pendency, must be measured in way that their bottom-line impact on patent quality can be
understood. Finally, patent quality metrics should bear upon not only the behavior of patent
examiners, but also the behavior of patent applicants and patent holders, and their contributions
to quality.
Structured correctly, comparative patent metrics satisfy a number of these criteria.
Tracing what happens when the same patent applications are filed in multiple jurisdictions
enables neutral, third party comparisons of the diverse fates of these patents that is observable in
the public record. Since 1996, the five Patent Offices have collected and published statistics on
several patenting milestones, enabling direct comparisons that include all applications, issuances,
and in-force patents,93 not just a subset of them. The collaborative reports of the so-called “IP5”
(US, Japanese, European, Korean, and Chinese Patent Offices) provide year-over-year,
standardized views of the production of all patents, at the level of patent technological classes, as
well as the processes of patenting (including fees),94 supporting comparisons across time and
jurisdictions.
Patent Application
Patent Examination
Patent Renewal

Patents in Force
91

See, e.g. Marc Adler, Patent Quality Taskforce (2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/advisory/ppac/patent_quality_tf_report.pdf
92
Kappos and Graham, supra note ___, at Recommendation 3 (calling for independent analysis).
93
IP5 Statistics Reports, fiveIPoffices (2014), http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports.html (listing
reports of the IP5 Patent Offices from 2011, and from 2006-2010, from the IP3 Offices of the EPO).
94
Statistical Data Resources, fiveIPoffices (2011-2016), http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticaldata.html.
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Being able to track patenting at different phases in a patent’s lifecycle has another
benefit. Existing patent quality metrics tend to focus exclusively on the behavior of the patent
office – its mistakes, too-high grant rate, and lack of consistency. But the quality and quantity of
patents in force is the product of three sets of decisions: to submit applications of certain quality
to the patent office (by the applicant), to grant the patent (by the patent office), and to keep
pursuing or keep in force, a patent (by the applicant/patentee). For example, neither the US
podcasting nor the US check imaging patent discussed at the beginning of this article was ever
the subject of a counterpart European patent, but decisions by the applicant as well as by the
European Patent Office produced this outcome. The application that matured into US Patent
6,032,137 over check imaging, for example, was also the basis of seven patent applications at the
EPO,95 but none were granted.96 Patent protection outside the US over the ’504 podcasting patent
was never even sought.97 To understand the impact of both examiner and applicant decisions on
patent quality, it is important to observe, and compare metrics at each of the main three phases of
a patent’s life – application, examination, and renewal. The sections below do so, but only after
explaining why the EPO provides the best point of comparison, despite the limits of a
comparative approach.
C. Why Compare the US and EPO
Among options for comparing the US to with respect to patent quality, the EPO stands
out. The GDP of the EPO’s 40 member states98 is roughly equivalent to the GDP of the United
States99, and the EPO has about double the population of the US.100 The EPO is widely
recognized as the “gold standard” in patent quality among patent examiners and practitioners.
Industry surveys conducted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015-2016 have each consistently found
the EPO to have the highest ratings among the five leading Patent Offices around the world.101
This perception is robust across the subgroups surveyed – companies, patent lawyers, and non-
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See “Also Published As” section of http://www.google.com/patents/US6032137 (listing related applications
EP1008086A2,EP1008086A4, EP1688876A2,EP1688876A3, EP1986148A1,EP2267652A1, EP2267653A1)
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practicing entities.102 Based on interviewing about 140 examiners from countries all around the
world from the period covering 2004-2008, Peter Drahos found that the EPO had the best
reputation, including for its searching capabilities and esprit de corps – the personal pride
examiners took in the quality of their work product.103
But while Europe may be closer to the US than other patent jurisdictions, significant
differences remain. As detailed later, the two systems are different in law, procedure, and
administration, and to some degree that is actually the point, to look at how such differences
translate into different outcomes. In Parts III and IV, for example, we explore the consequences
of the Europe’s “once and done” approach to examination, as opposed to the US’ approach of
allowing patent-seekers to continue examination even after final rejection, as well as the
relatively more aggressive schedule of renewal fees in Europe than the US, as departure points
for considered discussion.
We also acknowledge, however, that some differences are much harder to compensate for
than others. Examiner salaries must follow US Civil Service grades.104 At the European Patent
Office,105 the average examiner gets nearly double the salary of her American counterpart and is
exempt from national taxes.106 Buoyed by the strong demand for technical and legal talent in the
US, US patent examiners often have opportunities to advance professionally by leaving the
USPTO to become patent lawyers or an engineer at a startup or existing firm,107 whereas EPO
examiners tend to view EPO jobs as prestigious and conferring lifetime tenure.108 Because the
USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority, anytime it does something that appears to
heighten the burden on applicants109 it is vulnerable to claims by patent applicants, sometimes
bitterly contested legal ones, that it is overstepping its authority.110 While the EPO and USPTO
have similar GDPs, European patents must be perfected and enforced in individual countries
whose markets are much smaller than the US. 111 Finally, the EPO is also continuously evolving,
making it a moving target at best.112
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Differences both within and outside the control of patent system administrators and
patent policy mean that particular insights gleaned below may be actionable to different extents,
and based on varying degrees of effort. With this important caveat in mind, the next part of this
paper details our methodological approach for carrying out the empirical portion of comparison,
then implements it.
1. Methodological Approach
Empirical analyses of patents are limited by the quality and completeness of available
data, and those issues are compounded in comparative studies. Fortunately, analyses of patents
filed in multiple jurisdictions have been of interest for several decades,113 and I, working together
with a team of research assistants, draw primarily on familiar approaches and data sources to
carry out our comparison. For numbers of patents applied for and granted, the legal status of
claims, and their technology classifications, we rely upon data provided directly by the USPTO
and the EPO to PATSTAT, one of the most widely used patent databases for researchers.114
PATSTAT was created by the EPO at the request of the international patent offices,115 and the
data contained within it has several limitations, which we describe below.
The European Patent Office was formed in 1978 and so continent-wide data is not
available before then. The United States only began systematically publishing patent applications
in March 2001, so this paper relies on application data reported in PATSTAT from then until
June 2015.116 The technology field and sector data technology categories reported by PATSTAT
are based on international patent classes whose definitions change often, and a patent is often
assigned to more than one class (with the sector assignment based on the first, or primary, class),
reducing the precision of technology category data.117 We rely on the technology field and sector
codings provided by PATSTAT based on WIPO’s classification of patents into one of five
sectors (electrical engineering, instruments, chemistry (and pharmaceuticals), mechanical
engineering, and other fields) and 35 fields devised by Schmoch.118 In focusing on patents
applied for through the EPO, we exclude the minority of patent filings in each individual country
pursued directly through national offices.119 We also exclude non-utility patents (e.g. design
113

Catalina Martínez C. Patent families: When Do Different Definitions Really Matter?. 86 SCIENTOMETRICS 39
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patents, utility model patents), some of which are offered by the US and certain countries in
Europe.
D. Comparative Applications, Patents, and Renewals
This article takes as its unit of analysis all US and EPO patent applications filed in 2002,
the first full year for which US application data was available following the USPTO’s
implementation of the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999.120 Approximately 120,076
utility patent applications were filed at the EPO with a priority date of 2002.121 The USPTO
received more than double that number, 273,619.122 By 2015, the USPTO had granted about 74%
of these applications and the EPO had granted about 50% of these applications123 with about 6%
of applications still pending.124 This translates into about 203K US patents and 57.6K EPO
patents from filing year 2002.125 At the time of this writing, not enough time had passed to know
the number of patents in force at the end of the eligible patent term of 20 years. However, the
USPTO and EPO calculate that 37% and 12% of US and EPO patents, respectively, filed in 2002
will remain in force 20 years after filing,126 so we use the numbers in our estimate.

Unless otherwise indicated, the EPO statistics presented in this chapter represent EPO applications and grants,
received through both “regional” and “international” routes. While the percentage of patents pursued through
national filings is small, it varies by country. For example, in the years 2006 and 2012, the EPO received about 70%
of all applications for Germany and 90% of all applications for the UK.
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http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/TSR.pdf, Table 2.3. (reporting 334,445 applications from 2002, including
about 40,000 PCT applications (source: 9/8/15 correspondence with the PTO))
123
Using the “Granted” status field in PATSTAT for the 2002 patents available in that database.
124
Explained in Part I, supra.
125
These ratios are roughly in line, for example, with grants in 2013, which totaled 277.8K and 66.7K (numbers
include PCT filed applications).
126
Trilateral Statistics, Trilateral Statistics Report 2012, available at
http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/annex.pdf, (Maintenance of Patents Granted by the Trilateral offices
Table). Cf 2013 renewal projections of 40% and 20% in the US and EPO, respectively, for patents filed in 2013
(http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2013edition.html (Statistical Tables)).
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FIG __ Projected Patents in Force based on Patent Applications filed at the USPTO and EPO in
2002
120K EPO
applications
x
50% grant rate
x
12% projected Y20
renewal rate

273K US
applications
x
74% grant rate
x
37% projected Y20
renewal rate

75K US patents in
force in Y20
(projected)

6.9K EPO patents* in
force in Y20
(projected)

Sources: PATSTAT 2015 (application and grant numbers), Trilateral Statistics 2002 Report
(renewal rates). *patents originally issued by the EPO and validated in at least one member state.
The data shows that at every stage in the patent lifecycle, the US system tilts towards a
higher quantity patent system than does the EPO. In 2002, the USPTO saw more than double the
applications that the EPO saw and granted 50% more of its applications than did the EPO,
resulting in about three to four times more issued patents. Holders of US patents were projected
to be three times more likely to leave their patents in force for 20 years after filings than were
holders of EPO patents validated in member states. Collectively, this translates into a situation
where 20 years after filing about 75K US patents will remain in force, while less than a tenth of
that quantity of EPO patents— 6.9K — are expected to be in force somewhere in an EPO
member state,127 a striking difference.
We observed strong technology effects. The most dramatic gaps between EPO and US
performance appear among applications that belong to the “electrical engineering” category, a
field that includes computer technology, digital communication, telecommunications, and related
fields.128 Three times as many applications were filed in 2002, and five times as many
technology patents were issued on these applications by the USPTO than by the EPO, resulting
in a seventeen-fold difference in the number of patents in force by year 20 after filing.129 In
contrast, less than two times as many chemical and pharmaceutical patents were filed in the US
127

As noted before, the EPO’s numbers exclude national patent applications filed directly within a country, and
patent holders may chose not to validate their EPO patents within those countries, so the number of patents within
an individual European country will vary from this total.
128
Schmoch, supra note __, at Table 2
129
The USPTO and EPO received 99,764 and 32,861 non-PCT electrical engineering patent applications, and issued
75,557 and 13,464 patents on these applications, respectively. Assuming a 37% and 12% Year 20 in-force rate
(http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/2002/annex.pdf (Maintenance of Patents Granted by the Trilateral offices
Table), this would result in 27,956 and 1,615 US and EPO electrical engineering patents, respectively, a ratio of
approximately 17 to 1.
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than the EPO, and fewer than three times as many patents were issued in the US than were issued
in the EPO. 130 Although there have been many demands to reform software patents,131 it is
worth noting that just applying European grant and renewal rates or even US chemical
application rates to US applications would reduce, dramatically, the number of technology
patents in force.
The overall view reveals the relative contribution of applicant and examiner decisions
regarding the quality and quantity of patents in force. Although the US grant rate is about 50%
higher than the EPO grant rate, even greater gaps exist between the two jurisdictions in the
number of applications filed and the number of patents maintained. A number of variables
determine the application rate, including patent doctrine, industry norms and uses for patents that
do not require exclusivity (e.g. signaling). In addition, while relatively less attention has been
paid to post-grant, as opposed to pre-grant, quality control mechanisms, the potential gains from
a shorter patent life are just as considerable as the gains from increased quality.
Over time, the numbers in this snapshot have changed, though in different directions. The
gap in applications has increased, with the USPTO receiving close to four times as many patent
applications as the EPO did in 2014, the last year for which complete data is available.132
Reported application allowance rates in the US and the EPO have also fluctuated from 2002
through 2013, however, the 20-30% difference in grant between the two jurisdictions has stayed
constant.133 Finally, the gap in renewal rates has narrowed a bit, from patents being three times
as likely to remain in force in the US to two times as likely to remain in force by the end of year
20.134 With this baseline established, we now proceed to explore the determinants of quality at
each stage in a patent’s life.
II.

Quality (and Quantity) Levers at the Patent Application Stage

The quality and quantity of patent applications submitted to the USPTO is a function of a
number of factors including levels of R&D, the pace of innovation, industry norms, and the letter
and administration of patent law. While it has been widely noted that the US experienced growth
in patent applications with the expansion of patentable subject matter and strengthening of US
patents by the Federal Circuit in the 1990s, quantifying the contribution of this and other factors,
like fluctuations in innovation or R&D, industry dynamics, and technology trends has remained
elusive. A comparative view helps control for these factors, and disaggregates legal, technology,
applicant, and other effects on patent quality.
130

The USPTO and EPO received 51,662 and 30,295 non-PCT “chemical” patent applications, and issued 34,192
and 14,452 patents on these applications, respectively, a ratio of approximately 2.4 to 1.
131
Described, e.g. in Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012) (describing
proposals including a five-year software patent term for mitigating the harms associated with software patents); see
also, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1139 (1990) (describing opposition to software
patents by many mathematicians, computer scientists, and others in the software development community.)
132
FIVEIPOFFICES, IP5 Statistics Report 2014: Chapter 4 Patent Activity at the IP5 Offices, 49 (available at
http://www.fiveipoffices.org/statistics/statisticsreports/2014edition/chapter4.pdf).
133
Quillen & Cotropia, supra note ____, at Figure 9.
134
Id. at 57 and accompanying Table (showing maintenance rates of 40% and 20% by year 20 in the US and EPO,
respectfully)
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A. The Differences in Application Rates (Including Over Time) and What
Explains Them
1. Technology Effects - The Software Patent Problem
As noted earlier, the USPTO now gets four times more patent applications as the EPO,
which has nearly double the covered population. However, this snapshot of patenting behavior
and outcomes doesn’t reveal when and how the relative increase in demand for US patents was
experienced. Looking more closely, at patent grants by year (since US applications are not
available prior to 2001), we can see that a surge in technology patents in particular has grown the
gap.135 (FIG.____) From 1996 to 2008, in the US, the percentage of “electrical engineering”
patents, which includes computer technology, digital communication, telecommunications, and
related fields,136 nearly doubled, from 24% to 46%137 of all patents by the USPTO issued
annually. During this time, shares of electrical engineering patents at the JPO and EPO grew, but
much more modestly, about 25%.138 Driven by legal, technological, and industry developments
the increase in filings strained patent examination resources in the US. As the Patent Office
attempted to cope with the backlog, there was a decline and then an increase in patent grant
rate.139

135

As to the EPO patents, it should be noted that patents in Europe may be sought outside of the EPO, however the
proportion of non-EPO European patent applications is generally small, around 10-30%. See discussion in Part I,
supra.
136
Id. at Table 2.
137
Accord USPTO Chief Economist Office, supra note ___ at Figure 9 (showing disproportionate growth in US
electrical and electronics and computers and communication patent applications from 1995 to 2015).
138
In the EPO and JPO the share of electrical engineering patent grants grew from 24% to 29% and 28% to 35% of
patents, respectfully, based on analysis of PATSTAT data. This time period was chosen because of the availability
of Japanese data, which is hard to obtain reliably by class IPC prior to 1996 and after 2008. Author’s own analysis.
Accord Trilateral Patent Offices Report (2012), supra note __ (reporting, by 2011, that 29% of EPO patent
applications, vs. 49% of USPTO applications, and 35% of JPO application were electrical engineering patents.
Earlier year views by these categories are not available.)
139
Dennis Crouch, USPTO Allowance Rate, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/08/uspto-allowance-rate.html (depicting and describing, regarding the PTO
allowance rate, the “Dudas-Drop in the second-half of the last decade and the subsequent Kappos-Climb”).
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FIG. ___: EPO and US Patent Grants by Industry, 1986 to 2011
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Source: PATSTAT 2015, author's analysis. Technology sector data provided by WIPO in
accordance with Schmoch (2008)140 [File: combined surge data 2]
We are hardly the only ones to notice the prominent role that software and business
method patents, and disputes about them, have played in the US patent system. The share of
overall patents covering software, which spans several technological categories, grew from 20%
of patents in 1991 to more than half of all issued patents in 2011,141 and software-related patents
were associated with nearly 90% of the increase in defendants to patent litigations initiated from
2007 through 2011,142 a period also associated with an increasing share of assertions brought by
patent assertion entities.143 Non-practicing entities disproportionately litigate software patents,
based on judicial decisions.144 Software patents have overwhelmingly lost when put to the test in
litigation, but only after they have been asserted multiple times.145
2. Legal Effects and Approaches to Software
140

Schmoch, supra note ___. The “Electrical Engineering” category includes Computer Technology, Basic
Communication Processes, IT Methods For Management, Semiconductors, Electrical Machinery, Audio-Visual
Technology, Telecommunications, Digital Communication.
141
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help
Improve Patent Quality (2013), at 13; available at
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/GAO-12-465_Final_Report_on_Patent_Litigation.pdf;
accord Colleen V. Chien, Exclusionary and Diffusionary Levers in Patent Law, 90 SOUTHERN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016), at FIG. 1.
142
Id., Gov’t Accountability.
143
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, (June 2013) (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
144
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David Schwartz, How Often Do PAEs Win Patent Suits?, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. *3-4 (forthcoming 2016).
145
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 695–96 (2011). See also Shawn P. Miller, What’s the Connection Between Repeat
Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 316
(2013) (concurring that software and NPE-owned patents lose more).
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Although software has not always been broadly patentable, the Federal Circuit’s State
Street decision in 1998 ruled that inventions that produced “a useful, concrete and tangible
result" could be patented.146 For three decades, the Supreme Court did not find any patent barred
on subject matter restrictions, although inventions could still be ineligible on other grounds. The
little known Federal Circuit case In re Vaeck,147 in combination with the USPTO practice, made
it harder to reject inventions as obvious. The case held that an invention would not be considered
obvious unless there was a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art to combine old
elements to make the invention.148 Taking the three-judge panel’s decision literally, the USPTO
instituted a practice of requiring Examiners to complete the difficult task of search for writings
that in a sense, reflected the obvious, in order to reject patents.149 In 2006, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in the eBay case noted that "burgeoning number" of business-method patents were
of "potential vagueness and suspect validity."150
The EPO’s approach was, and continues to be, different. According to Chapter 52 of the
European Patent Convention, only inventions with a technical character are eligible for patents,
and methods of doing business and computer programs “as such” are explicitly excluded.151
However software inventions that nonetheless represent an “inventive step,” towards solving a
technical problem are patentable.152
In 2013, 25 years after the Federal Circuit’s State Street decision, the Supreme Court
broke with its pattern of not rejecting patents on eligibility ground. Denying a patent application
over a method of hedging risk in energy commodities trading, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme
Court rejected a single test for patentability153 and the State Street test.154 In Alice v. CLS Bank,
the Court decided that merely implementing an abstract idea on a computer did not make it
patentable. These cases, along with a few others on the patentability of subject matter, have
called into question scores of already issued as well as pending patents, not only on software but

146

State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
947 F.2d 488, 20 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
148
Id. (“To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some
suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of
ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a
reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or
suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed combination and the reasonable
expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, not in applicant’s disclosure”).
149
Jake Ward, The Evolution of MPEP 2143 – Prima Facie Case of Obviousness, PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAW
BLOG (Feb. 23, 2008), https://anticipatethis.wordpress.com/2008/02/23/the-evolution-of-mpep-2143-prima-faciecase-of-obviousness/ (showing that pre-KSR MPEP guidance to Examiners reflected the Veack standard).
150
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006).
151
The European Patent Convention, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legaltexts/html/epc/2013/e/ar52.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
152
European Commission Press Release, Proposal For A Directive On The Patentability Of Computer-Implemented
Inventions - Frequently Asked Questions, Reference: MEMO/02/32, Brussels, Feb. 20 2002, europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-02-32_en.pdf (describing the standard for patentability applied by the EPO to software patents and
noting that, by 2002, at least 30,000 patents for computer-implemented inventions had been issued by the EPO).
153
561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010).
154
Id. at 601.
147
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diagnostic methods155 and DNA. The check imaging patent described at the outset of this article,
as well as patents over recognizing different data formats156 and using digital signatures to
identify spam email,157 have been deemed ineligible.
The courts have elevated other patent-quality standards as they apply to software. In June
2013, the White House and USPTO announced an initiative to apply greater scrutiny to
functional claiming, the practice common in software patents of drafting claims in order to
capture broad, and many would argue unwarranted, scope in enforcement.158 However, the
PTO’s job is to apply the law, and few court decisions had addressed the sort of scrutiny that is
warranted. The Federal Circuit’s Williamson en banc decision159 in 2015 addressed this void.
Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus did away with the incredibly low bar set by
the Federal Circuit that only “insolubly ambiguous” patents are too vague to warrant
protection.160 The Court’s earlier decision in KSR v. Teleflex, part of the same stretch of
decisions that made the Federal Circuit the most overturned circuit court in the United States,161
did away with the rigid rule that a finding of obviousness requires a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation, and enabled examiners to rely more on common sense.162
The long-term impact on patent quality of recent case law shifts will depend on how
these cases influence the behavior of applicants and the PTO. Already they have had a
significant impact on the existing stock of challenged patents163 and, all other things being equal,
fewer inventions should be patent eligible and fewer applications received by the USPTO. Some
commentators believe that the US patent system’s patent quality woes began with the formation
of the Federal Circuit as well as the State Street decision.164 But whether they end with the
current slate of decisions will depend on the robustness of other non-doctrinal dynamics,
discussed next.
3. Industry Effects – Defensive, Strategic, and Portfolio Patenting
155

See, e.g., Exergen Corp. v. Thermomedics, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D. Mass. 2015) (invalidating a patent on a
forehead thermometer based on the insight that forehead measurements are reliable); Kevin Noonan, Patent Watch:
Diagnostic Patents at Risk after Federal Circuit Decisions, NATURE: NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY (May 20,
2016), http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v15/n6/full/nrd.2016.105.html (describing cases of diagnostic tools being
deemed ineligible for patent protection).
156
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
157
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 371 (D. Del. 2015).
158
Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013).
159
Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en banc), superseding 770 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2014)
160
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014).
161
Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE (Jan./Feb.
2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/magazine/LandslideJan2010_Hofer.authcheckdam.
pdf (documenting an 83% reversal rate for the Federal Circuit from 1999-2008, the highest among all circuits, and a
92.3% reversal rate in patent cases).
162
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
163
Robert R. Sachs, #Alicestorm: July is Smoking Hot, Hot, Hot…And Versata is Not, Not, Not, BILSKI BLOG (Jul.
14, 2015), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/07/alicestorm-july-is-hot-hot-hotand-versata-is-not-not-not.html
(reporting an invalidation rate of ~70% of patents challenged on patentable subject matter grounds in the first 13
months following the Alice Corp v. CLS Bank decision).
164
See, e.g. Bessen & Meurer, supra note ___, at ____.
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The quality of issued patents depends on the quality of applications submitted to the
patent office. But a number of factors independent of patent law have put upward pressure on the
number of patents filed, and a corresponding downward pressure on the amount of time and
money each applicant puts into each individual patent. Unpacking these motives reveals that the
demand for patents will remain even as the courts remove some of the scope of patentable
subject matter, reducing the chance that dramatic changes to the law will alone translate into
dramatic changes in the number of application filings.
In technology areas characterized by cumulative innovation, for example, the purpose of
patents has become largely strategic: entities seek patents in order to have something to trade
with others and thereby achieve freedom to innovate, rather than to exclude others from the
technology. The pursuit of patents over incremental improvements in order to build defensive
arsenals, a dynamic that was spurred by the licensing campaigns of IBM and Texas Instruments
in the late 1990s in software and technology industries, has been well documented.165
“Defensive” patenting is now pervasive in many industries besides computers.166 The embrace of
strategic or portfolio167 patenting has also placed a greater emphasis on the quantity of the whole
rather than the quality of the individual parts within a set of patents.
In a number of surveys, half or more of patentees say they pursue patents for defensive
reasons,168 and we believe that the proportion of patents pursued primarily for those reasons is at
least as high. When Google acquired Motorola and its 25,000 patents in 2011, CEO Larry Page
said that it did for defensive reasons— in order “to better protect [its operating system] Android
from anti-competitive threats from Microsoft, Apple and other companies.”169 Among the top 50
owners of patents,170 many if not most of them are “high-tech” companies that depend on
freedom of action in order to keep up with the rapid pace of competition. Over 2,000 companies,
including five out of the top ten have taken steps to commit some or all of their patents to
defensive uses.171
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See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001) (examining the propensity
of semiconductor firms to obtain patents despite their ineffectiveness in appropriating returns to research and
development (“R&D”)); James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007). (providing empirical accounts of the apparent “arms race” in the semiconductor and
software industries); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), 26–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (documenting the prevalence of defensive motives in patenting); Chien,
Arms Race supra note ____at ___ (same).
166
See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, 44-45 (2014) (documenting the prevalence of defensive patenting in biopharma industries).
167
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
168
See Chien, Exclusionary and Diffusionary, supra note ___ at Part II.A. for an overview of surveys.
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Larry Page, Supercharging Android: Google to Acquire Motorola Mobility, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 15,
2011), available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/supercharging-android-google-to-acquire.html.
170
IFI CLAIMS Patent Services, IFI CLAIMS 2014 Top 50 US Patent Assignees (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.ificlaims.com/index.php?page=misc_top_50_2014 (last visited ____).
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The OIN Community, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/community-oflicensees/ (listing over 2,050 companies as within the Open Invention Network community as licensees, members,
or affiliate members, that commit themselves to the OIN patent non-aggression pledge) (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).
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Comparing national R&D and national patenting trends also provides information about
the amount of investment reflected in each individual patent. As described earlier, the vast
majority of companies doing R&D do not file for patents making the match between R&D and
patents inexact at best.172 However, based on our independent calculation using available data,
and building on work done by Hunt and Bessen,173 we observe that the rise in the number of
technology patents over the past few decades has been accompanied by a diminishing amount of
R&D per patent,174 consistent with the evolving industry dynamic discussed above, and likely
due to other factors as well. Using R&D figures provided by the National Science Foundation by
SIC/NAICS category, and the numbers of patents applied for by US entities during the same
period within these categories,175 we calculated the ratio between R&D and patents from 1980 to
2008. At its peak, in 1983, $5M of national R&D was spent per electrical equipment and
computing patent. By 2007, according to the same methodology, this number had declined to
about a fifth of that, $1.04M of national R&D per patent in inflation-adjusted dollars.176 (FIG
___) In contrast, chemicals patents have reflected a declining, but then rising R&D per patent
ratio.177

For further discussion of the OIN pledge and others, see Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543
(2015).
172
Brandon Shackelford, One in Five U.S. Businesses with R&D Applied for a U.S. Patent in 2008, NA’L SCIENCE
FOUNDATION (Feb. 2013), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf13307/.
173
Bessen & Hunt, supra note ___ at ___.
174
In order to correlate R&D and patenting activity, we drew from two sets of data. For R&D data, we relied on the
National Science Foundation's Survey of Industrial Research and Development, the "the primary source of
information on research and development performed or funded by businesses within the United States." The annual
survey, conducted by the Census Bureau examines a nationally representative sample of companies in
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries, and establishes total US R&D expenditures, by the government and
private companies. (http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry/) The survey reports on total manufacturing and nonmanufacturing R&D by SIC code, up to 1998, and NAICS code in 1999 and after. We took several steps to
compensate for deficiencies in the data. First, at the individual line item level (encompassing one or more SIC
codes), data over the time series was at times missing or suppressed for confidentiality reasons. To reduce
distortions that could be caused by missing data, we selected for analysis the two subcategories - Chemicals and
Computer and Electronic products - where few data points were missing: 8 out of 68. We approximated these 8
missing values by applying a simple averaging or ratio functions based on available data, consistent with other
researchers (correspondence with the NSF). The transition from SIC- to NAICS-based reporting created a
discontinuity in the data in 1999. Although the SIC and NAICS categories that represent Chemicals and
Computer/Electronic Products are similar, they are not a perfect match. To compensate, we applied a smoothing
function to enable a time series view, performing checks on the individual time series before doing so. For patent
counts, we relied on the USPTO's databases of patent and patent applications, and relied upon their primary IPC
number to associate them, using the "Algorithmic Links with Probabilities" (ALP) concordance devised by Lybbert
and Zolas, (described at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/econ_stat/en/economics/pdf/wp5.pdf) to specific SIC
and NAICS categories of interest. The match from patents to industrial categories was inexact as, for example,
patents were at times assigned to multiple IPCs, which were in turn associated with particular SIC or NAICs codes.
We used the first IPC class to assign each patents to an industrial class, making each patent count potentially both
under and over inclusive.
175
Application data was not available for the entire period.
176
Based on applying a smoothing function to compensate in a change from SIC to NAICS-based reporting in 1999.
177
See also Helene Dernis & Mosahid Khan, Triadic Patent Families Methodology Fig. 12 (OECD, STI Working
Paper 2004/2, 2004) (reporting relatively constant ratios of triadic patent families to industry-financed R&D from
1985 to 1999, based on residence of the inventor).
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FIG__: R&D (in $M) per US Origin Patent Application
1980‐2007 (inflation adjusted)
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Other studies, using different methodologies and timeframes, have shown mixed results
regarding the overall ratio between R&D and patents.178 However, the two studies we found
which disaggregate patent per R&D by technology category report findings consistent with ours.
Kim and Marschke find that until 1983 patents per R&D in the computer industry declined but
from 1983–2000 it increased.179 The authors also find that patents per R&D decreased for the
pharmaceutical industry through 2000. Hicks and her coauthors found that patents per million
dollars in R&D doubled in the information technology category between 1989 and 1998, but that
patents per R&D was stable for chemical and other technology categories.180
The downward trend in R&D per tech patent is consistent with the perception that over
the past few decades more technology patent applications, each covering less, have been filed.
Empirical work, generally surveys, have also led to a better understanding of the other reasons
178

Cf. Daniel Wilson, Are We Running out of New Ideas? A Look at Patents and R&D, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F.
(Sept. 12, 2003) available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economicletter/2003/september/are-we-running-out-of-new-ideas-a-look-at-patents-and-research-and-development/, 2011
World Intellectual Property Indicators, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 8 (2011),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/941/wipo_pub_941_2011.pdf (finding that US R&D
expenditures have increased faster than US patenting has over the periods 1953 to 1999 and 1995-2010,
respectively), and Samuel Kortum, Equilibrium R&D and the Patent–R&D Ratio: U.S. Evidence, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 450, ___ (1993) (finding that the ratio of patents to R&D fell 1975 and 1989).
179
Jinyoung Kim & Gerald Marschke, Accounting For the Recent Surge In U.S. Patenting: Changes in R&D
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companies file for patents, and the often non-exclusionary motives that motivate, at least in part,
the decision to patent. For specialized innovators, like universities and technology specialists, for
example, patents facilitate transfer of the technology to commercialization partners in support of
“open innovation,” 181 given that patents are generally easier to transact in than trade secrets.
Small companies and startups are motivated to file for patents in order to attract financing, in
addition to reasons of exclusion and defense.182
B. Application Patent Quality Levers
1.Separating the Wheat from the Chaff at the Application Stage
Certain patent mistakes are very expensive. Take the example of the ‘137 check imaging
patent that was only invalidated after it had helped to generate licensing fees of $350M. None of
the seven related applications at the EPO became a patent – 4 were refused outright by the EPO,
and 3 were withdrawn.183 In an ideal world, more resources would be allocated to examining
such applications, while less would be used to vet those that will never be enforced. On the same
day the USPTO granted the ‘137 patent, it granted thousands of other patents. In the vast
majority of cases, the patent were neither asserted in court nor used to pursue high-profile patent
licensing campaigns. A number of the patents likely served as the basis for a technology
transaction, enhanced a company’s reputation for innovation, were used to recognize the
contributions of an inventor, or just sat on the shelf. The odds are that many were so
economically unimportant that they were left to lapse before their full 20-year term.184 How
important is it to ensure the quality, for example, of a patent relied upon by a young company to
secure a bank loan but which the company has no intention to enforce? Somewhat, two scenarios
suggest. First, it is impossible for follow-on innovators to know that the intention of the patentee
is to use the patent only in non-exclusionary ways, leading other to greater inefficiency as others
unnecessarily “design-around” the patent. Second, even if the original owner of the patent
disavows exclusionary motives, things can change, for example in the bankruptcy or sale of a
company, or a shift in company strategy.185 Patent trolls often buy patents from defunct or still
operating companies that themselves often aren’t in a position to assert the patents, due, for
example, to the threat of retaliation, reputational costs, and a lack of alignment with the business.
If a patent is broad, even if its validity is highly suspect, it can still be used as the basis of a
licensing campaign or lawsuits.
Still, given the diverse uses to which patents are applied, it is worthwhile to consider how
we might distinguish between applications that, once they mature into patents, are likely to
181
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matter, from the rest, and to allocate examination resources accordingly. One option would be to
create two tiers of patent applications – one that receives little or no examination, and one that
receives heightened examination. The move to a patent registration system in 1793 that Jefferson
carried out,186 effected half of this transition, and both Germany and China allow inventors to
apply for “petty patents,” that are registered with little examination, alongside regular, utility
patents.187 In a similar vein, Lemley and his co-authors have proposed allowing patentees to
designate the applications they think matter and elect more rigorous examination for them. The
applications that withstand the higher level of scrutiny would be considered “gold-plated” and
would therefore receive a heightened presumption of validity.188 This proposal has often been
coupled with the idea that, regarding the other, less significant, patents, examiners are justified in
remaining “rationally ignorant,” because the patents don’t matter much.189 An alternative to
allowing applicants to “upgrade” their patent before they issue through heightened reviews, is to
allow third parties to “downgrade” or invalidate after they issue, through post-grant quality
reviews.
Differentially applying quality filters in these ways has problems, however. It is difficult
for patentees to know ahead of time which patents are worth gold plating, as a patent’s value
only emerges over time.190 The idea of relegating all remaining patents to limited review,
because they don’t seem to matter, has been roundly criticized.191
Post-grant challenges that take place after a patent has issued have the advantage of
reflecting evolving market and technical conditions and information, however they are expensive
and time-consuming, and because they are largely brought by third party challengers, in a sense,
come “too late” – after the challenger has been accused in a patent case. An ideal mechanism
would combine the virtues of these two approaches and eliminate their vices – by enabling the
identification and heightened scrutiny of patents that are likely to be enforced to come later in a
patent’s life and be initiated by the patentee as well as third parties. We discuss one proposal for
doing so, through the implementation of a “defensive only” patent, in Part IV.
However, if designating only certain applications for heightened quality reviews when
they are applied for isn’t possible, another alternative is to increase quality for all patents during
the examination process, which we explore next.
III.

Patent Quality Levers At the Examination Stage

Conversations about patent quality tend to devolve into discussions about patent office
shortcomings. This part begins differently, by following the lead of Thomas Jefferson, one of
186
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America’s first patent examiners, in acknowledging that applying patent quality filters is both
difficult and time consuming. As historian PJ Federico recounts, Jefferson was “quite favorable
to the granting of patents, and granted them with great consideration, the other duties of
members of this Board, in view of their high offices, made it impossible for them to devote much
time to this work. As a result the law was changed in 1793 to make the granting of patents a
clerical function.”192 This transition reflected the sense that if examination couldn’t be done
properly, it shouldn’t be done at all.
The case studies described at the beginning of this article highlight the challenges. Before
the ‘137 check imaging patent described above was revoked by the Patent Office, it was upheld
by the Patent Office,193 in a proceeding called reexamination, as well as by a Texas jury.194 The
question of patent validity is not purely a technical determination but also a legal and evidentiary
one. To examine a patent, as described in Chapter 2, requires interpreting and understanding the
claims, applying external knowledge and references to an evolving legal standard, and arriving at
a legal conclusion. To evaluate the application that eventually became the ‘704 podcasting
patent, a patent examiner had to search for references that were more than a decade old. One of
the references ultimately relied on to invalidate the patent, supplied by an outsider, not the
USPTO or applicant, was an unpublished master’s thesis from MIT. 195
While examiners in the USPTO and EPO carry out the tasks described above in very
different ways, they apply largely the same standards. These are some differences in how the
tests are articulated – for example, European examiners apply an “inventive step,” rather than
“obviousness” filter and, unlike American examiners, use a “problem-solution” approach to
determine whether or not a patent application meets the standard.196 For years, certain classes of
prior art were not available in the US, due to the American grace period, but these differences,
minor to start with, have narrowed in recent years.197 Trilateral studies of patent examination
conducted by the PTO, EPO, and JPO198 have found that, despite the different articulation of
legal standards in each jurisdiction, the application of them and the same technical references to
the same application yields largely the same outcomes.
192
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What explains, then, the differences in outcomes between the two jurisdictions? In the
following paragraphs, we document that there are differences, not only with respect to the grant
rate, which is higher for the US, but also with respect to customer satisfaction and quality, which
are higher for the EPO. We focus on two practices that contribute to the EPO’s favorable quality
ratings. First, the EPO invests heavily in getting quality right – it allocates more examiners, more
time, and more checks to ensuring that patentability decisions are accurate. The US examination
process, in contrast, has a high tolerance for mistakes, because it allows applicants to refile their
rejected applications, and in many cases, get these cases allowed. This practice, while it limits
the negative consequences associated with any bad examiner decision, makes examiner
inconsistency and mistakes tolerable, in turn, driving lower patent quality and satisfaction.
Second, the EPO process has several notable safeguards for overcoming the tunnel vision that
results from the ex parte nature of the examination process. It dedicates extensive time and
resources to searching and accurately reflecting the state of the art, produces a higher citation to
non-patent literature, and uses a team examination approach which reduces inconsistency and
promotes the application of “common sense” perspectives. It is also slower, more expensive, and
less likely to give applicants the patents they seek.
1. The Differences in Grant Rates and What Explains Them
Ours is not the first study to document the disparities in EPO and US grant rates. Jensen
and his colleagues have done a series of studies looking at comparative outcomes.199 Analyzing a
cohort of patent applications submitted to the Australian, European, and Japanese Patent Offices
from 1990-1995 that matched as equivalents 9,618 US patents,200 they found that the Australian
Patent Office granted almost all (86%) of these applications, while the JPO granted less than half
of them (42.6%) and the EPO grant rate was between (74%) these two figures.201 Harhoff and
Graham analyzed the EPO counterparts of a sample of 2,474 US patents litigated from 19632003 and their non-litigated counterparts, and report comparable grant rates, between EPO grant
rates of 68% (among counterparts to non-litigated US patents) and 80% (among counterparts
litigated US patents), as compared to US patents (100% grant rate).202
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One limitation of both of these studies is that they are based on US patents, rather than
applications, necessarily excluding applications that never matured into patents in the United
States. It could be the case, for example, that while the EPO only grants a portion of United
States patents, the inverse is also true – that the United States only grants a portion of EPO
patents, reducing any perceived gap in allowance rates. Quillen and Cotropia have documented
the relatively lower overall grant rate in the EPO, as compared to the US, using official data. But
while their analysis, as well as the one that we report earlier in this article, of applications from
both jurisdictions, addresses the mismatch caused by comparing applications to patents, it could
still be the case that the applications submitted to the EPO are weaker than those submitted to the
USPTO, downward biasing the EPO grant rate, relative to the US one. Another weakness of
these studies, is that, due to their design, they did not observe time and technology effects.
To address these limitations, we created a set of matched EPO – USPTO patent
applications from the cohort year analyzed earlier, 2002. Patent rights are territorial, so an
inventor seeking protection over the same invention in multiple jurisdictions must file multiple
applications. If an applicant for a US patent also seeks protection in Europe, she will typically
file the same application, with slight modifications,203 within a year to the European Patent
Office or World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO). While there are numerous ways to
associate EPO and US patent applications, in our analysis we applied the most conservative
approach and matched US and EPO patent documents with identical priority claims.204 We
included in our set all available EPO and US application pairs from 2002205 (N=99,221), and
traced the fate of each application through the two jurisdictions. We focused first on whether or
not the application had been “Granted,” a status designated in PATSTAT.206
Based on the same set of applications, 77% were granted in the US, while only 52% were
granted in the EPO. This difference was robust across all 5 sector categories – in each case, more
US than EPO patents resulted. Among technology sectors, the differences were most pronounced
for electrical engineering (or “technology”) patents (FIG __). While technology patent
applications had a less than one in two chance of maturing into a patent in the EPO, it had a
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greater than three out of four chances to mature into a US patent.207 This translated into a 34%
difference between EPO and US grant rates among electrical engineering patents. The difference
was less pronounced, but still significant for the other classes of patents. Chemistry and
mechanical engineering applications were 17%, and instruments applications, 29% more likely
to be awarded in the US as compared to the EPO. (FIG __)
The differences were remarkably robust. In every one of the 35 sector subcategories
defined by WIPO, we found, the US was more likely to grant a patent than was the EPO.208
However, it is possible that they are an artifact of the period of time tested, as the fluctuations in
US grant rates over time has been well-documented. To rule out this possibility, we expanded
our analysis to a sample that included EPO applications matched to US grants from the period
from 1975-2014. We found the relatively lower EPO grant rate to persist over time, consistent
with the findings of Quillen and Cotropia,209 and observed that the relative EPO grant rate, in
fact, declined over the tested period, though we believe some of the decline is due to time effects.
These results confirm and expand upon earlier results.210
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Of the 2,784 applications classified as “electrical engineering,” 76%, or 2,105 became US patents, while 43%, or
1,273 became EPO patents.
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Source: Author’s analysis based on PATSTAT 2015, Smoch/WIPO, [File: Slide 14 data]211
The pervasiveness of the gap in grant rates across technology areas between the two
jurisdictions is striking. What explains it? There are several possibility. One is that US patents
are not strictly comparable to EPO patents because they are narrower in scope and claims.
Because of the difficulty of testing this hypothesis we were not able to test it, and cannot rule it
out as a major contributor. However, one might also assume that the difference is in the
stringency of examiners at the EPO and USPTO, and based on the perspective that the US is
issuing too many patents of low quality (rather than that the EPO is applying too high a standard
to issue too few patents), that US examiners are too lenient. If this were the case, we would
expect a lower rate of rejection in the USPTO than the EPO, a testable hypothesis.
To probe whether or not applicants experienced fewer rejections at the PTO than EPO,
consistent with the hypothesis of examiner leniency, we compared the outcomes of non-granted
and granted cases, taking into account key differences among possible outcomes. The
allowability of an application filed at the EPO is determined over a series of steps, culminating,
if it proceeds all the way, in an Examiner’s decision to grant or refuse the application. Along the
way the applicant may withdraw from the application process, affirmatively or passively, or the
application may remain pending, leading to each application having one of four statuses: granted,
withdrawn, refused, or still pending.212 The US process is similar in a number of ways, allowing
applicants to “abandon” their cases by not responding to an office action or paying a patent issue
fee, but it also differs in one important way – a US Patent examiner can never definitively refuse
an application after examining it.213 This is because, in the US Patent office, unlike anywhere
else in the world, applicants have the right to continue examination with the patent office despite
a final rejection, by filing a request for continued examination (RCE), or, within a limited period
of time, a continuation application. There are no limits to the number of times an applicant can
refile the same application, and the negotiation can go on for years.214 As a result, patent
applications filed at the USPTO only have three effective statuses: granted, withdrawn (or
abandoned), or still pending.
We looked at the legal status histories of EPO non-granted patent applications in our
cohort to determine how they were resolved.215 But the results of our analysis (FIG ___) revealed
a surprising result – when an application was not granted at the EPO, the reason was not that a
case had been refused, but instead because it had been withdrawn. Among the 3,517 applications
that were not granted in the EPO, 81% of ungranted cases were withdrawn by the applicant,
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while 13% were pending and 6% were refused. Of the US counterparts to these non-granted EPO
applications, in contrast, the majority (64%) were granted, and the rest were abandoned.216

FIG ___The Resolution of Non‐Granted European
Patent Applications (N= 3,517)
6% 13%

81%

Pending

Withdrawn

Refused

2. Investing in Accuracy at the EPO v. Tolerating Error at the USPTO
When one looks at the EPO examination process to explain the large share of withdrawn
applications, a few features stand out. First, in the EPO, as in other jurisdictions,217 search and
examination are separate, and examination only takes place if there is an affirmative request for
examination. (FIG___) This results in a large percentage of applications being abandoned even
before examination has taken place: as EPO President Battistelli has stated, “patents are granted
in 49% of total filings, with 22% of applications abandoned after the search report and 29%
abandoned after examination.”218 In our cohort, in which 81% of ungranted cases were
withdrawn, that translates into 35% of cases withdrawn after search, and 46% after examination.
(FIG ___)
FIG ____: Examination Procedures at the EPO and the USPTO (adapted from IP5 2013
Handbook)
216
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But while the EPO process affords the applicant discretion during examination, this
discretion in principal ends when the patent is refused. At this point, the applicant’s options are
limited,219 as the EPO has decided the merits of the case, and reached a determination that the
patent as filed does not meet its requirements. In contrast, in the US, even if the Examiner has
reached a “final” decision about the application’s success or lack of success, the applicant has the
right to effectively refile the application through a “request for continued examination,” or
through a “continuation” application and have new claims issued and considered.
The ability of applicants to extend examination has benefits for applicants who can use
the additional time to determine whether or not their invention is commercial valuable, as well as
to avoid the consequences of an inadequate examiner that rejects their claims. But the ability to
extend examination indefinitely has also raised concerns because it enables applicants to draft
patent claims to cover emerging developments in the marketplace, interfering with
219
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competition.220 “Submarine” patents which are delayed in examination before being “launched”
onto a mature industry have been a feature of the US patent since at least 1873, when the
Woodbury planing-machine patent issued 24 years after it was filed, and subsequently used as
the basis for mass litigation.221
The inability of patent examiners to definitively dispense of patent applications has
consequences for patent quality. It effectively incorporates a high tolerance for mistakes made by
an examiner in her rejection of the application, as a continued filing or a refiling can overcome
an examiner’s adverse “final rejection”. This, in combination with the high levels of
inconsistency among Examiners documented by others,222 encourages patentees who at first do
not succeed to try, and try again, in what has been described as an attempt to “wear down” the
Examiner,223 or get another, “better” or more favorable one. This contributes to an overall
dynamic in which the failure of the applicant and Examiner to get it right, in a sense, is viewed
as routine and expected, and lacking in permanent consequence as to the eventual grant of the
application.
The same tolerance for error is not present in the EPO process. Instead, the EPO invests
more upfront in ensuring that the prior art search report is comprehensive and that the
substantive examination of the invention and application are technically correct. This greater
investment translates into more people, more time, and more checks during the process.
For example, in the EPO, an Examination Division of at least three examiners224 makes
the decision to grant a patent.225 When an application advances to the examination phase, a first
examiner, a second examiner, and a chairman are assigned to the case, “[f]or maximum
objectivity.”226 Although the first examiner bears primary responsibility, she confers with her
colleagues and the decision to grant or refuse a patent is issued by the entire Division.227 This
panel approach reduces the risk of inconsistency, and the impact of an individual outlier
examiner as decisions are the product of a group review. Although the process of search at the
EPO is carried out by a single examiner, the examiner is required to consult with other examiners
if her search report is positive, to avoid improperly raising the expectations of the applicant. In
the US, an application is also assigned to an art unit, or group of examiners. However, the
decision to allow the patent is the primary responsibility of a single Examiner, though a
Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE) may weigh in.228
The significant investment by the EPO into upfront patent examination is also reflected in
the amount of time that examiners are allocated. According to a study by van Pottelsberghe de la
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Potterie, former EPO Chief Economist, EPO Examiners on average get about 30 hours to
examine a patent, vs. 19 at the PTO. 229 Much of the extra time is spent earlier, rather than later in
prosecution, as further discussed below.
3. Looking Beyond the Patent Office, at Non-Patent Literature
Through this comparative analysis, we are not saying that the US should necessarily
strive to reduce its grant rates to EPO levels or move overnight to separate examination from
search, for example. The relatively greater investment of the EPO in quality comes at a cost – for
example, while US examiners have less time to carry out search and examination tasks, their
output is also higher than their counterparts – each US examiner examines an average of 1700
claims per year, vs. 500 per EPO examiner.230 The fees associated with a US patent are lower,
and in fact are the lowest in the world, when examination and maintenance fees are taken into
account. (See FIG ___ ) While we save our discussion of the tradeoffs between cost and
efficiency to later in this article, we discuss in this subsection the outcomes associated with the
additional investment in quality, from the perspective of technical accuracy, social calculus, and
applicant satisfaction.
We return to the basic task of a patent examiner – to ensure that patents are granted to
novel and nonobvious ideas. Although seemingly simple, finding the closest reference to an
invention has long been recognized as challenging. For example, in 1967, a Presidential
Commission opposed granting software patents for this reason, stating that “the Patent Office
now cannot examine applications for programs because of the lack of a classification technique
and the requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be
feasible or economic because of the tremendous amount of prior art being generated.”231 To
carry out searches requires an examiner to be “a living encyclopedia of science… His
multifarious duties require an intimate and thorough knowledge of the whole circle of science
and art.”232 While the US Patent Commissioner in his Annual Review wrote these words in 1845,
the challenges remain.
It is no longer feasible, for example, if it ever were, for patent examiners to know the
relevant art in all technology fields. This puts pressure on the classification of applications,
which in turn determines the universe of prior art that is searched in the first instance.
Compounding the problem, particularly within high-technology areas, is the prevalence of nonstandard ways of referring to technical object, and the diversity of relevant technology precursors
to any particular invention. An examiner looking for prior references to “smartphones” may need
to search the literature on pagers, telephony, mobile communication, and personal computers, for
example. In contrast, there are only a limited number of ways to refer to a hydrogen molecule.233
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Perhaps the most significant problem, however, is the large volume of innovation that
happens outside of the patent system. The job of an examiner is to evaluate the invention before
them in light of the current state of the art. While patents provide some indicia, the patent statute
requires many other classes of references, including any written materials (digitized or not),
sales, and prior uses of inventions, to be considered. Only one in five companies doing research
and development files for patents,234 and in many industries technology is now openly
disseminated in written yet non-standard form, whether through shared source code, standards or
technical disclosures. There are ways for the patent office to access these outside perspectives,
including through submissions by the applicant, who are required, as described in Chapter 2, to
disclose all relevant references to the patent office. However, the limited amount of time that US
examiners have to conduct prior art searches, and the ex parte nature of the patent examination,
as we have previously described, tend towards tunnel vision and the decision to grant, rather than
deny, applications.
A number of scholars have looked at the adequacy – or inadequacy – of references relied
upon during examination. These studies have documented the heterogeneity in citation
patterns,235 and compared references provided by the applicant to references found independently
by the Examiner.236 However, to date there has been no systematic way to measure the quality of
examination based on prior art, raising again the problem of measurement.
An important indicia of the quality of examination is the extent to which non-patent
references are cited by the examiner. Working scientists and engineers, whose knowledge is to
serve as the yardstick for evaluating the technical merit of an invention, largely do not rely on
patents to figure out whether or not something has been done before or how to do it.237 Neither
should patent examiners, although patents may be the easiest source for them to access, since
they are generated for examiners and with the input of examiners (on the claims). Studies have
documented the greater prevalence of non-patent prior art references among certain, highly
litigated patents, 238 as well as the greater propensity of applicants to submit non-patent
references to the examiner for her consideration.239 However, just because a reference was
submitted to the patent examiner does not mean that the reference was meaningfully considered
in the course of examination. Indeed, Cotropia and his co-authors have documented the
disproportionate reliance by examiners upon the references they find themselves, and on patent
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references, and the tendency of examiners to ignore art that is submitted by applicants.240 To put
yourself in the eyes of someone in the field, the examiner’s basic job, requires one to read what
those in the field are reading, and to understand the references that one in the field understands.
An important indicator that the patent examiner is doing her job is the examiner’s citation of
non-patent literature.
The metric of examiner use of non-patent literature has several advantages. Unlike in
other areas of patent law, it is generally undisputed that, “core to substantive quality is the prior
art search.”241 The extent of US examiner citation of non-patent literature citation is also readily
observable, due to a policy change in 2001 in the way in which patent citations are reported.242
Perhaps most importantly, the USPTO itself has recognized the importance of “ways to get the
best prior art in front of an examiner as soon as possible in the examination process,” making it a
priority in its most recent patent quality initiative.243 The USPTO and the executive branch,
during the Obama Administration, have also acknowledged the importance of incorporating
outside perspectives and non-patent literature into the examination process through a number of
initiatives.244
To take stock of the extent of US and EPO examiner use of non-patent literature in the
examination of patents, we returned to our matched sample of patents filed in September 2002.
We applied slightly different methodologies to each analysis, due to differences in how EPO and
US examination are carried out, and the ways in which examination records are constructed. In
the US, examiner citation patterns are memorialized in two ways in US patent records. First,
during the course of examination, the examiner lists the references that she relies upon in a prior
art rejection or mentions as pertinent in a separate form.245 Each reference is designated as
belonging to one of three categories: patent reference, foreign patent reference, and non-patent
documents.246 Second, whenever a patent application or patent is published, the same references,
“relied upon by Examiner” are memorialized through an asterix on the face of the publication,
according to a practice that was introduced in 2001.247 Just as is the case with references cited by
240
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the examiner during examination, references are designated as falling into one of three
categories: “US Patent documents,” “Foreign Patent documents,” or “Other Publications.” The
examiner is allowed, but not required, to draw from search reports provided by international
searching authorities or references provided by applicants when they decide which references to
rely upon.
In the EPO, search and examination proceed separately (FIG___). During the search
phase, the EPO examiner, in consultation with other examiners as described earlier, reviews the
prior art. A report including the results of the search, as well as an initial opinion regarding
patentability based on the search, is published by the EPO.248 In cases where EPO applications
have been first filed internationally, and the EPO is designated as the search authority,
preparation of the international search report fulfills the search phase, and the examiner that
performs this search becomes part of the EPO team assigned to the application, should it advance
through EPO examination.249 When the internationally filed patent application is subject to an
earlier search carried out by another office, the EPO examiner may generate an additional,
“supplementary search,”250 to complement the existing international search. The search report
designates the ways in which the examiner is relying on the references through a series of codes,
with the most common codes representing documents that establish the application’s lack of
novelty (“X” document) or inventive step (“Y”).251 The references cited by the EPO examiner
and in international search reports are accessible in the EPO at two different websites,
“Espacenet” and “EP Register,” the latter of which also includes search results associated with
EPO applications that have been filed internationally and searched by a non-EPO national office,
and some applicant filed citations.252 Each cite identifies the source of the citation: international

248

Generally, EPO search reports are published as an Annex to the “A1” publication of the patent application 18
months after the application was filed, an “A2” or“A3” publication of the application, or a “A4” supplementary
search, described infra at note ___ . EPO “B” publications, which are granted patents, do not include search report
results (US “B” publication do contain the citation history of the patent). European Patent Office, Basic Definitions,
available at http://www.epo.org/searching/essentials/definitions.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2015), presentation by Kris
Loveniers, EPO, “Search Matters 2014”
249
Correspondence with EPO official on file with author.
250
supra note __
251
Kris Loveniers, How to Interpret EPO Search Reports, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (2014), available at
http://people.unica.it/liaisonoffice/files/2014/05/How-to-Interpret-EPO-Search-Reports.pdf
252
The two databases vary in scope and purposes, but for the identification of examiner-cited prior art, have few
differences except that the EP Register includes references generated by non-EP searching authorities in the case of
EP patents first filed through the PCT (It also includes some additional references cited by the applicant, but we do
not include such references in our analysis as they are not “examiner-cited.”). Espacenet is “a database of
publications and documents, comprising patent publications from all around the world, including those from the
EPO. Espacenet also includes other prior art documents such as non-patent literature, designs, utility models etc.
Espacenet is, in short, a “prior art” database. The European Patent Register is a database of legal and procedural
status data, only for patents processed by the EPO. It also contains access to the file wrapper associated with each
patent dossier.” Correspondence with the EPO, Sept 3. References at both websites can be found in the “citations”
tab of an application, however, the EP Register consolidates information from all publications into a single website,
whereas Espacenet has different pages for each publication cf, e.g., for EP patent application EP2021283, with
publications A1 and A4,
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=EP&NR=2021283A1&KC=A1&FT=D,
http://worldwide.espacenet.com/publicationDetails/biblio?CC=EP&NR=2021283A4&KC=A4&FT=D (separate

42

search report, EP search, or applicant search, and we included the first two categories as
“Examiner-cited.”253
We coded for the citation of non-patent literature in the two offices by consulting the
sources mentioned, making a few adjustments to ensure an accurate comparison. With respect to
US applications, in the majority of cases (N=5,542 out of 7,417), the patent had already been
issued, and we consulted the front page asterix information of the published patent, as captured
and made available by Google Patents,254 and performed spot checks to ensure that this
information was consistently reported. Where the application had not yet matured into a patent
(N=1,875), we hand-inspected the patent’s file history posted to PAIR and looked at the
references that had been cited by the Examiner, if any.255 In some cases, citation information was
not publicly available due to secrecy requests by the applicant, or because the application was
abandoned prior to publication or search and we excluded these applications from our analysis.
We carried out a similar process with respect to European applications. First, we
consulted the consolidated citation history of the EP Register for each patent. Next, to see if the
results were significantly different based on studying Espacenet and Google Patents citation data,
we coded 100 patents using all three methods. The Register and Google Patents contained
substantially the same information,256 but we found Espacenet to periodically exclude references
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included by the other two sources,257 and, at times, for there to be disagreements between the
sources as to whether a source was Non-Patent Literature.258 We report the EP results based on
the Register, as it represents the most comprehensive source of data, but as before, when
examiner citations data was unavailable, for example because an application was abandoned
before search could be carried out, we excluded it from our results. We were left with 7,176
USPTO and 7,255 EPO data points (out of the possible 7,417), in our analysis. We report our
results in FIG ___.

FIG___: US v. EPO Examiner Use of Non‐Patent
Literature
Chemistry
Electrical engineering
Mechanical engineering
Instruments
Other fields
Average All
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US Examiner‐cited NPL

EPO Examiner‐cited NPL

Source: Author Analysis based on USPTO PAIR, Google Patents, EP Register
There were strong differences in citation patterns. Across the board, in every single
category, the EPO was more likely to cite non-patent literature than the USPTO, in its
examination of the same, non-withdrawn patent applications. While 44% of EPO applications
included a reference to non-patent literature, only about 14% of US patents did. The gaps were
most pronounced among mechanical engineering applications, where non-patent literature was
nearly six times more likely to be relied upon an Examiner in the EPO case than by an examiner
in the US case. Electrical engineering applications were four times as likely to be evaluated in
view of non-patents by EPO examiners than by US examiners, while, among the major sectors,
US and EPO examiners of chemistry patents were the most likely to cite non-patent literature.
We also observed variations at the class level. For example, class 705 patents “business method”
applications were almost twice as likely to receive examiner-based NPL citations as applications
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in general.259 This could be an artifact of the PTO’s “second pair of eyes program” that put
greater scrutiny on business method patents but also resulted in much lower grant rates.260
4. Taking Time To Get it Right
Why and how do EPO examiners rely so heavily on non-patent prior art? There are a
number of reasons, beginning with the way in which examination is designed. Search is
separated from examination and Examiners are instructed to, at the outset, carry out “thorough,
high-quality, all-embracing search …[and] reduce to a minimum the possibility of failing to
discover complete anticipations (sic) for any claims.”261 The intent of the search report is to
support a decision by the applicant, “whether to continue prosecuting their applications and have
them examined,” and overall, to “make it possible to determine, on the basis of the documents
mentioned in the search report, whether and to what extent the invention is patentable,”262 in the
words of the EPO board of appeals. Almost half of all withdrawn cases are withdrawn during the
search phase before examination, as mentioned earlier.263
The EPO also makes efforts to ensure that its examiners have access to the best prior art,
including non-patent literature. The EPO’s “EPOQUE” search system, which contains more than
a hundred databases, is viewed by many to be the best in the world.264 For example, it maintains
a partnership with the IEEE and other standards setting bodies to collect non-patent
specifications,265 and the USPTO has been urged to do the same.266 The Patent Cooperation
Treaty, which supplies a large number of EPO applications,267 requires “mandatory search” of
certain databases of non-patent references that the public can submit prior art to.268
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But greater access to outside perspectives alone can't explain the EPO’s higher rate of
non-patent literature citation. The US examination process actually arguably provides more
access than does the EPO examination process to the relevant references that applicants know
about, by requiring them to be provided to the examiner under the applicant’s duty of disclosure,
described in Chapter 2.269 In fact, when there is a matching case before the EPO, the EPO search
report normally will be submitted to the USPTO through this route. However, while applicant
references generally include a high share of non-patent literature, they are infrequently used by
US examiners, who overwhelmingly rely upon only the references they find themselves.270 This
makes intuitive sense, particularly when the motivation for submission by applicants may be
unclear,271 and presumably, applicants have reviewed the art that they have supplied and are
submitting claims that steer clear of those references. However, it also means that USPTO
examiners are not focusing or relying on the most relevant prior art – that which the applicant
and other examiners know about.
The simpler explanation is that US examiners are not allocated enough time to do their
job, in particular to search for, review, and apply prior art, as others have noted.272 Searches for
prior art, are reportedly performed, on average, in about two hours or less at the USPTO, as
compared to eight hours at the EPO,273 and the average in 2015 is believed to be even higher,
around twelve hours,274 although, in both jurisdictions, the amount of time allocated to search
tasks depends on the technology.275 Finding and digesting new references applicable to the
particular case takes time and reduces examiner output on a per hour basis. It is also required in
order for examiners to fulfill their statutory mandate to grant patents only on novel and nonobvious inventions. The substantially greater amount of time dedicated to search in the EPO,
which leads to substantially higher rates of NPL citation, is consistent with the overall contrast
we have drawn between the US and EPO, and the substantial, early investment of the EPO in
examination.
5.Quality v. Efficiency of Examination
That a greater investment in search leads examiners to cite a more diverse set of
references hardly surprises. But the different approaches that the USPTO and EPO apply have
largely overlooked consequences for the quantity and quality of granted patents. In the US, the
upfront investment in quality by the Patent Office is relatively lower, in terms of examiner time,
269
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but the risks associated with examination mistakes or inconsistencies is also reduced through the
ability of patent applicants to refile their application if they get outcomes they are dissatisfied
with. Examination and grants come earlier and more often to US applicants, and at a lower cost.
The EPO process has other strengths and weaknesses. The measured and staged nature of
the EPO examination process invites applicants to evaluate at each phase of the process their
options for pursuing the patent, and to develop a strong sense of the patent’s likely fate within
the EPO. Cases that are not granted are withdrawn, often just based on the search, conveying the
sense that even though applicants often do not get the patents they apply for at the PTO, they
decide, at least in part, the fate of their applications. This leads applicants to withdraw their
applications to an extensive level, and to actually fail much more often in the pursuit of their
patents – about 50% more, than in the US. The process is high-touch with a number of quality
checks, supported by Examination teams who are careful not to raise expectations along the way,
among applicants.
From a social welfare perspective, the fewer unnecessary patents – patents that don’t
disclose anything new or nonobvious, or that induce innovation – the better. But what about the
private value of patent quality? Surprisingly, when asked, patent holders and companies have
given the highest marks to the jurisdiction that is less likely to give them what they want (a
granted patent), more slowly, and at a higher cost – the EPO. In surveys, the EPO has earned the
highest marks of any patent office for the quality of the patents it issues, and also the highest
levels of customer satisfaction. In a 2015 survey, for example, 62% of practicing lawyers and
60% attorneys and corporate IP managers gave EPO-issued patents a rating of excellent or very
good quality.276 The USPTO received ratings of 30% and 35% from the same populations.277 In
the 2015 survey, the EPO also received the highest marks of all five “IP5” offices in terms of
customer service.278 The strong support for the highly structured, quality-focused European
model is striking. Though applicants don’t necessarily get the patents they seek at the EPO, or
the unlimited freedom to continue having their patents examined, they remain in control of the
process, receiving early warnings of an application’s likely fate.
These findings imply that applicants favour European style examination, reflecting
greater upfront investment and a more circumscribed patent examination process. In 2006, the
USPTO moved to implement the latter when it proposed curtailing the use of “continuation”
applications and requests for continued examination,279 in order to address existing backlogs.
Patent lawyers and biopharmaceutical companies who file early in their product’s lifecycle, and
use the continuation process to refine their applications based on marketplace developments
strenuously resisted this initiative.280 While this sort of strategic game playing281 is detrimental to
276
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the system, to the extent it reflects a legitimate mismatch between product and patent lifecycles,
as discussed below, other ways of addressing this mismatch that are more narrowly tailored
would be preferable. However, if the resistance to curtailing continuations is based on the
perception that the USPTO makes a lot of mistakes in examination, it is worth considering
whether a commitment to fewer mistakes through a greater investment could offset this
resistance.
The benefits of thoroughly considering prior art when a patent is examined, rather than
later in the patent’s life, are real. To probe them, we took patents that had been the subject of a
finally decided inter partes review challenge as of summer 2015 (N=311), and determined that
over half of them (N=169) had a European counterpart application. Of these 169 applications,
less than half have matured into European patents.282 This means that, though most of the claims
that have been reviewed in the IPR proceedings have been invalidated completely by the Board,
many never even made it out of the European Patent Office, and were rejected much earlier. It is
also notable that, while US examiners cited non-patent literature in 16% of the US applications,
EPO relied on non-patent literature 30% of the time, and the PTAB relied on non-patent
literature in its final decision in 40% of these cases, by our count.283 According to a study by
John King, a 1% increase in examination hours might reduce the amount of litigation by an
estimated 3.94 cases per year. Whether this a good deal, of course, depends on how much the
increased costs and how much the reduction nets are.284
In recent years, the USPTO has recognized that patent quality is a major priority, and
announced initiatives around search and non-patent references. During the Obama
administration, the USPTO has made significant efforts to increase the stock of available nonpatent references, noting that “the most relevant information about a particular technology in an
application is sometimes difficult for examiners to locate and use. Because this information often
resides with the technical and scientific community, crowdsourcing and third-party submissions
are promising ways to uncover hard-to-find prior art,” and securing agreements from a number
of companies to provide hard-to-find references such as manuals to the office.285 In 2010, the
Office created the Patent Examiner Technical Training Program (PETTP), in order to help patent
examiners keep up with fast-changing technological fields, inviting technologists, engineers, and
other experts to provide relevant technical training and guidance to patent examiners,286 and
hundreds of companies have participated.287
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But the low citation of non-patent literature provided to Examiners already through
applicant disclosures casts serious doubt that greater access alone to references, without more
time to consider them, will translate into the more robust consideration of relevant references.
Fortunately, the examiner-cited non-patent literature metric, and progress on this dimension, can
independently be measured over time, using the techniques described in this article. In this way,
it has several advantages over some of the metrics discussed at the outset of this article. Unlike
grant rates, which reflect not only the quality of examination but also changes in the law and the
quality of applicant submission, the references that an examiner reviews and cites are largely
within the examiner’s control. Citation behavior is also observable for all patents and immune
from the selection issues that accompany court and PTAB- reversals. Comparisons against an
EPO benchmark are also possible, as we have demonstrated. Finally, as a process, rather than
outcome based metric, Examiner citation of non-patent literature can be measured and tracked in
real-time, at the granular level of an art unit, class, or even examiner, enabling progress to be
measured.
Being able to track the benefits associated with a greater investment in quality will be
important because, just as the downstream benefits of increased quality are real, the upfront costs
of increased quality could also be significant. If all US cases received a sixfold increase in the
amount of time allocated to search, and allocated a three-person panel to each case, for example,
holding all other things equal, the growth in costs and backlog and examination backlog could
also be considerable. There are two ways of limiting these effects, however.
First, more time could be allocated selectively, to give examiners more time, for example,
to consider international search results, or non-patent literature in particular. The applications
that are the subject of international search are more valuable, insofar as they reflect a greater
investment of resources by the applicant, and therefore are likely to be the ones that applicants
want to be sure will withstand later challenges, and any supplemental fees could be passed on to
applicants, particularly large ones. The examination units that feature the cases where missing
non-patent literature is most likely to matter could also get more time. These could include the
USPTO art units that have the most patents invalidated at the PTAB, on the basis that they are
novel or obvious, or which have the highest litigation hazard,288 or which show the greatest gaps
when compared to their EPO counterparts. Sorting for greater scrutiny in these ways has the
benefit of incorporating insights from related and past patterns of examination and litigation.
Another risk is that, higher costs, if passed on directly to applicants, could
disproportionately impact those who are more sensitive to them, including start-ups and small
and medium sized enterprises.289 Low filing fees have been the feature of the US patent system
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for many years,290 and they facilitate greater access to the patent system. However, there is no
reason that the costs of higher quality standards must be borne disproportionately by small and
medium enterprises, and a number of schemes could be used to prevent this result; indeed, the
fee increases that the USPTO introduced following passage of the America Invents Act actually
reduced the fees for the smallest applicants, “microentities” that are now entitled to a 75%
discount off examination fees, while it raised them for larger entities.291 We would favour
continuing to distribute future application rate increases in this way, that is to say,
disproportionally on larger companies, for whom an additional incremental patent filing, on a
portfolio of thousands, is likely to matter less to the health of the company than for a company
with a small portfolio.
There are a number of arguments that fee rises should, all things being equal, take place
during the maintenance, rather than examination phase of a patent. First, administrative fees at
the examination stage are only one component of the total cost to the applicant, as the cost of
preparing an application currently far outstrips patent office costs on the average application,
reducing their impact.292 Second, although raising fees at the examination stage can also reduce
congestion and increase the quality of submitted patents, studies that have looked at changing
patent filing behaviour by adjusting patent filing fees, including some by several of us, aren’t
encouraging.293 Increasing fees after a patent has issued, rather than before it, aligns the private
costs with the costs to society.294 We consider this policy lever in the next section.
IV.

Post-Grant Quality Mechanisms

Because a patent’s value only emerges over time, the point of a patent’s grant (or denial)
can both be thought of as “too late” to make a difference, since the patent has already issued (or
denied) as well as “too early” to know whether the patent actually matters. During the post-grant
period, the ability of members of the public to ask Patent Office judges to take a closer look at an
issued patent, through post-grant review procedures available both in the EPO, and in the US, is
a critical check on patent quality. In the US, post-grant review is expensive, costing each side in
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a review hundreds of thousands of dollars to complete.295 It is also narrow, only enabling review
on certain grounds or under certain circumstances.296 As a result, although generally justified
only for patents that are the subject of an active litigation or dispute.297 In Europe, for example,
whose well-regarded “opposition” system provided one model for the design of the current US
system,298 the share of patents subject to post-grant review is about 5%.299 Thus, while
considered the primary mechanism of post-grant patent quality control, post-grant reviews can
only provide limited relief.
In this Part, rather than focusing only the few patents that are contested, we consider
ways of influencing the quality and quantity of the majority of patents that are not. For example,
the patent term of 20 years is longer than the lifecycle of many products, as discussed below. But
relatively low US renewal fees enable patent holders to hold on to their patents for longer. In this
subsection, we discuss adjusting renewal fees and several other “post-grant” quality levers to
reward patent owners for voluntarily reducing the risks associated with their patents and putting
the public on notice concerning the patents its owners are practicing or planning to enforce.
Consistent with the use of patents for many purposes, many of them non-exclusionary, we
believe that patentees would respond to these incentives and therefore, many would voluntarily
opt into reduced effective terms beyond the life of a product covered by a patent.
A. Aligning Maintenance Fee Policy with Social Welfare
After a patent is granted, its owners must pay to keep it in force. United States
“maintenance fees” were introduced to the US in 1980; 300 before that, the owners of a patent
were automatically entitled to the full term. The change was dramatic when it took place –
following the introduction of fees, the growth in patents abruptly stopped, as expiring patents
offset new patents.301 In the same vein, changes to current maintenance fees, if significant
enough, would impact the quality and quantity of patents in force. Right now, US fees are among
the cheapest in the world, on a per capita GDP basis. (FIG___) US patents are also kept in force
longer than other leading jurisdictions,302 leading to a longer period of monopoly and higher
supracompetitive prices.
Some inventions arguably deserve a longer exclusivity term than 20 years. Budish and his
co-authors have noticed that company cancer researchers tend to invest less in earlier-stage
295
Jay P. Kesan, Arti K. Rai, & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERK. TECH. L.J. 45, 55 (2016).
296
As described in Chien & Helmers, supra note ____, post-grant review is only available for the first nine months
after issue, CBM review is only available for financial services patents, and only novelty and obviousness can be
revisited in inter partes review.
297
See Id. (documenting the high proportion of IPRed patents that are the subject of parallel litigation, and the low
percentage of litigated patents that is the subject of a post-grant review)
298
Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 438.
47 (2012).
299
See references described, e.g. in Chien & Helmers, supra note ___.
300
Marco et al, supra note ____. (citing 94 Stat. 3017 § 41; 35 USC 41)
301
Id. FIG. 6 (Annual Count of Patents in Force)
302
IP5 report, supra note ___ at FIG 4.8 (showing the USPTO, by year 20 after the filing date, to have the highest
rate of renewal (~48%), followed by the JPO (~27%), SIPO, EPO, and KIPO.)

51

cancer drugs than late-stage cancer drugs because they are much slower to bring to the market,
leaving a limited amount of time to recoup development expenses.303 But many product
lifecycles are shorter than the 20-year term offered by a patent.304 During a typical 5-year period,
two-thirds of US manufacturing firms switch their products,305 and in the US, people replace
their cellphones every two to three years.306 According to a study by Bilir, the shortest product
life cycles are in the electronics machinery (6.7 years) and computer and office equipment (8.4
years) industries, and the longest product lifecycles are in non-electric heating equipment (10.9
years) and metal cans and shipping containers (10.6).307 Broda and Weinstein find that computer
software ranks third highest in turnover of the 100 product types they studied.308 The
misalignment of patent and product times in the software industry extends to the application
process as well. In July 2016, it took about 25 months to get a patent.309 But in certain markets,
for example, the mobile app market, “fast followers” that mimic aspects of the original are often
introduced in less time.310 It has been reported that half of the revenue in the semiconductor
industry is derived from products that have been on the market for less than six months.311
One risk of patents that outlive the products they support is that they are sold to patent
assertion entities (PAEs), or trolls and then asserted. Love has found that non-practicing entities
disproportionately assert their patents at the end of a patent’s life, rather than the
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FIG___: Patent Litigation Timing
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beginning,312 while the reverse is true of operating companies. Replicating his analysis, among
patents litigated in 2010 and 2012, and relying on codings by Cotropia, Kesan, and Schwartz,313
we find a similar pattern (FIG___) – that PAE assertions were weighted towards the later years
of a patent’s term. Returns that outlast the original product that the patent was filed to support are
more likely to reflect an unexpected windfall than form any incentive to innovate that a patent
may provide.
For a variety of reasons, then, the duration of a patent has a considerable impact on the
costs and benefits to society associated with the patent. The longer a patent supports

312

Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls
Without Harming Innovators?, 161 UNIV. OF PENN. L. REV. 1309, 1359 (2011).
313
Christopher Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, 2010 and 2012 Patent Holder and Litigation Dataset
(last updated May 28, 2013), available at http://npedata.com/article/. The authors coded each case from 2010 as
belonging in one of 10 categories. For ease of viewing we grouped patent holding companies, large aggregators,
individuals and failed operating company/failed start-up in the PAE category, due to their inability to be retaliated
against, and included operating companies (including IP arms of Operating companies) and technology development
companies in “OpCo.” We conducted our analysis based on the first named patent in each case and omitted from the
analysis cases in which the plaintiff’s status or the asserted patents could not be determined. For the patent numbers
associated with each case, we received data from Lex Machina, and for the patent priority dates, we used data from
Innography.

53

supracompetitive pricing, the greater the deadweight loss to society.314 Renewal fees influence a
patentee’s decision to keep a patent in force, or not, and are an important driver of patent quality.
Comparatively speaking, US fees are on the low to lowest end of the range on a per capita basis.
This is because USPTO fees have been in an almost continuous decline (relative to GDP per
capita) since 1800.315 As a result, Park has found, the US charges the least, among major
jurisdictions, on a GDP per capita basis, to pursue and maintain a US patent, in an analysis.
(FIG___) On an absolute basis, it costs approximately $12600 (large entity) for the full twentyyear term,316 compared to €23855 in Europe for twenty years (approximately $26270).317
Changing how much it costs to keep a patent in force would likely lead to the earlier expiry of
patents that are “sitting on the shelf.”
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(Official Fees Country), IMF (2014 GDP values), Park 2010 (legal fees), IMF (global inflation
rates).
For all of these reasons, renewal fees should be set with social welfare considerations in
mind. Long-standing policy doesn’t fully permit the USPTO to do so, however, specifying that
fee collections are required to be dictated by the principle of cost recovery.318 As a historical
study documents, consistent with the US patent system’s emphasis on accessibility and
affordability, from the beginning, “[patent] payments were not intended to exact a price for the
patent privilege or to raise revenues for the state… rather, they were imposed to merely cover the
administrative expenses of the office.”319 For most of the PTO’s history, the Office has been
funded primarily with taxpayer revenues through annual appropriations legislation, not fees.320
Since 1990, Congress has required the USPTO to be self-funded.321 Initially, Congress
set most fees, and the USPTO was only authorized to set relatively minor fees, and make
adjustments to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index.322 This changed with the America
Invents Act, as Congress was seen as relatively poor steward of USPTO charges.323 Though the
total collection must still limited to those needed to cover the “aggregate estimated costs to the
Office for processing, activities, services and materials,”324 the USPTO now has much greater
freedom to determine fee levels.325 To its credit, the USPTO has made the sorts of adjustments,
directionally, that align patent fees with social welfare. It has lowered examination fees but made
up the difference in increases to maintenance fees. 326 It has also explored, through its Chief
Economists, the idea of limiting continuation practice by raising fees.327
Within this ambit, if the USPTO decided to invest significantly more in upfront
examination, for example, it could pass these expenses on to applicants, at the examination
318
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phase, or patentees, in the maintenance phase. However, it would have to move cautiously when
doing so, as there are several procedural hurdles that the USPTO would need to overcome in
order to increase fees. Any new fee proposals must be submitted to the Patent Public Advisory
Committee,328and the USPTO must engage the Committee at least forty-five days before
publishing the proposed rule and give the Committee thirty days to consider the proposal.329 The
Committee must then hold a public hearing and produce written recommendations, which the
USPTO must consider.330 At this point, the Director must notify Congress of the proposed
change and publish the proposed fee in the Federal Register, along with a description of the
reasons for the fee.331 Next, there is a public comment period of forty-five days, after which the
fee can be published; forty-five days following publication, the rule can go into effect absent a
congressional override.332
There are other problems with further skewing USPTO reliance towards maintenance,
rather than examination fees. Already, the USPTO subsidizes examination with maintenance
fees, and small and micro-entity fees, with large entity fees.333 Wasserman and Frakes have
found that these distortions cause the PTO, in times of urgency, to overgrant patents to large
entities that are more likely to renew their patents.334 The USPTO is not the only governmental
agency that is vulnerable to criticisms, at times grave, that its revenue-making authority
interferes with fairly carrying out its mission.335 Nor is it the only government agency that has to
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balance competing revenue pressures. However, the USPTO does appear to lack a number of the
safeguards that others have to reduce the need to balance revenues and expenses on an annual
basis. For example, the EPO, like the US, subsidizes examination renewal fees, and the office is
also self-funded. But the European Patent Office also owns substantial financial assets that are
sometimes used to supplement the funding derived from patent fees.336 In addition, the European
Patent Convention states that the Contracting States of the EPO must finance any deficit that the
office faces,337 an important backup source of revenue. In addition, some other permitting
agencies receive significant funding as part of the Federal Budget, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which requested $9 billion in funding in 2012,338 and brought in just
$252 million in fines in 2012.339 The USPTO’s ledger, in contrast, is substantially balanced. To
enable the USPTO to operate in a way that is dictated by its mission, rather than its finances
Congress should consider creating such buffers as well.
B. Redesigning Renewal Fees
Despite these challenges, we believe there are at least two ways that US maintenance fees
should be reconsidered. First, in line with considerations of equity, the USPTO should consider
raising US fees to historical and global norms, and using the balance to improve patent quality in
examination. Second, the US should consider adopting the practice of other jurisdictions of
requiring maintenance fees to be paid yearly, rather than periodically. Right now, for example, to
keep a European patent in force for 20 years not only costs roughly double what is costs to keep
a US patent in force,340 but, because maintenance fees are due yearly, also requires the patentee
to make 17 separate decisions to keep a patent in force, and to make 17 payments. In contrast,
because in the US, the compared to making only 3 affirmative decisions to keep a US patent in
force. The systems therefore set different defaults – in the US, for example, once the third
payment is made, the patent defaults to staying in effect for the remaining 5+ years of its term.341
In the EPO, if the patentee does nothing, the patent will naturally expire, unless, each of the
remaining years in its life, the patentee pays a fee. The behavioral science literature has
documented the power of defaults.342 When workers were automatically enrolled in savings
plans, their participation increased from 49% to 86%.343 Defaults have also shown to be effective
significantly more car accidents (David Kidwell, “Experts: Chicago's Short Yellow Light Times, Red Light Cameras
a Risky Mix,” Chicago Tribune, December 23, 2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/redlight/ctyellow-light-timing-met-20141223-story.html#page=1)
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in encouraging energy conservation.344 Support for using behavioral science insights to effect
positive social outcomes is now embedded into the federal government.345 It would be worth
using this power to explore the consequences of the USPTO switching to a different fee
schedule.
While there is substantially more work to do before the USPTO’s renewal fee structure
can be changed, we offer two other ways to reduce the offensive threats associated with
particular patents while still preserving the value that patents add to their owners.
C. Removing Offensive Threats through Defensive Only Patents
Concerns about patents outliving their intended purpose have been particularly acute with
respect to software patents. As Love and others have documented, suggestions of a shortened
software patent term have sounded from diverse source ranging from academics, Federal Circuit
Judge Pauline Newman, activists, and Jeff Bezos.346 There are practical problems with
mandating that software patents be given shortened terms, however, including the difficulty of
defining what a software patent is, and the international law mandate that “patents shall be
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to…the field of technology.”347
The latter limitation, when viewed in juxtaposition with the EPO’s ban on computer program
patents per se, suggests that any restriction on software inventions should happen at the level of
extending protection, not the duration of protection.348
One alternative to reducing the term of software patents is to offer holders of defensive
patents, software or otherwise, the option to designate their patents as “defensive only.” 349
“Defensive only” patents would be examined like ordinary patents. However, they would be
enforceable only if a patent holder were the subject to an offensive threat, for example a demand
letter or lawsuit. The patentholder could elect the “defensive only” designation at any time,
entitling the owner to a discount off of any applicable fees, say 50%.350 Once the patent
application or patent was designated as defensive, it would retain that status until lapsed. That
way, a patentee could gain many of the advantages associated with holding a patent – signalling
to the world innovative potential, providing a basis for financing (to some degree), and ensuring
some measure of freedom of operation – without imposing much of the costs to society generally
associated with patent holding. The cost savings would likely be appealing for those whose large
patent portfolios require large payments to maintain and which pose the greatest threats to
smaller companies. Some smaller companies may also find this option appealing in order to
signal to their employees their commitment to open source sharing, or defensive intentions
344
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though small companies may have a higher proportion of crown jewel and fewer “defensive”
patents in their portfolios.
While this idea may sound radical, it is not. Under Germany’s “License of Right” (LOR)
scheme, a patent owner that declares that anyone can practice the invention in return for
reasonable compensation receives a 50% discount off their maintenance fees;351 the UK has long
featured a similar scheme.352 In addition, a number of the most innovative companies in the
world have already made public commitments to commit their patents to defensive uses only.
Under the Inventor Protection Agreement (IPA) adopted by Twitter, the company has promised
to its employees that it will only use their patents for “defensive purposes,”353 a commitment that
has been used to attract talent and build culture at the firm.354 Tesla has made a similar
commitment, to “open source” its patents over electric vehicles and battery storage technology
and make them freely available except to those who assert their patents against the company.355
IBM, which has been the top filer for patents for years, as well as Sony, Google, LG Electronics,
Canon, and about 2,050 other companies356 are signatories to the Open Invention Network’s
(OIN) “non-aggression” pact, which commits them to granting royalty-free patent licenses over
Linux technology to other signatories.357 These various pledges and promises demonstrate the
strong interest in defensive uses of patents, as well as shortcomings with existing solutions – like
other promises, one-way pledges are unenforceable in the absence of reasonable reliance.358
Offering a defensive only patent option would enable sorting between high and low value
(defensive only) patents. However, unlike gold-plating during examination, a defensive patent
option would be available any time, including after the patent has been granted and more
information about the patent’s value has emerged. It would not require development of a second,
heightened tier of review. And though it should appeal most to companies that engage in
defensive patenting, which are concentrated in the tech sector, it would be voluntary, thereby
avoiding running afoul of bans on technological discrimination or the requirement of a 20-year
patent term enshrined in international law.359
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According to surveys, 45-60% of companies acquire patents for defensive reasons,
though even more obtain patents to prevent copying.360 But Tesla’s experience is instructive. The
company originally got patents, “out of concern that the big car companies would copy our
technology.” However, over time, Tesla discovered “[w]e couldn’t have been more wrong. The
unfortunate reality is the opposite: electric car programs [] at the major manufacturers are small
to non-existent.”361 However, just because Tesla is abandoning the desire to prevent copying, it
isn’t abandoning its patents. Instead, it has used them to encourage adoption of its technology
and for defensive purposes,362 has also used its patents to secure financing.363 Though perhaps
not the primary reason Tesla acquired patents, these non-exclusionary uses promote innovation
at the company. In the same way, companies may hold their patents for non-defensive reasons,
but then transition to a primarily defensive purpose over time.
D. Fixing the Marking Requirement364
I conclude this Part by considering one other fairly obvious, but largely overlooked way
that the risks associated with patents staying in force can be reduced. Although patent law is a
strict liability offense, the intuition that patentees have the obligation to let the world know about
the patents they plan to enforce, so that others may avoid infringing, unawares, is enshrined in
the law through a doctrine called patent “marking.”
According to this doctrine, to recover damages during the period of infringement, those
who practice their inventions are required to put the world on notice by marking products or their
packaging in order.365 Typically this comes in the form of a “Patent Number” listing. In the
absence of marking, an infringer doesn’t owe damages unless they have actual, legal notice. The
purpose of the marking requirement is to prevent innocent infringement and encourage patentees
to give notice of the existence of their patents.366 Over time, however, this important safeguard
has been quietly eroded. A 1936 case ruled that, for practical reasons, the marking requirement
did not to apply to those who did not practice their patented inventions367 or to process patents.368
As a result, those who might otherwise have notice of the patents that its holders seek to enforce,
360
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or at least may seek to recover damages on – the only legal benefit that marking confers – no
longer have the benefit of that notice in connection with process or unpracticed patents.
A restored marking requirement – which would require some sort of effort and notice to
the world with respect to patents that the patentee seeks to enforce – would, in the same way as a
defensive only option, or gold-plating enable the patentholder to differentiate between patents.
Just as a defensive only patent would identify the patents that a patentholder does not intend to
enforce, a “marked” patent would identify to the world the patents that the patentholder does
intend to claim damages on. Knowing what patents have a higher chance of being enforced can
limit the risks associated with poor patent quality. Just like the election of a “defensive only”
patent option, the decision to mark a patent separates it from others, and enables the efficient
allocation of resources towards the patents that matter. Follow on innovators can allocate more
resources towards reviewing the validity of the patent, or designing around it, for example.
Closing this loophole as others have called for,369 and restoring the notice requirement for all
patents, would in this way reduce the risks associated with low patent quality.
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